
The Democratic Project in Nigeria Since 1999: Some Matters Arising from Francis Fukuyama's the End of History and the Last Man

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Abstract: *It is difficult to remember a book that made as big a splash as Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* when it appeared in 1992. The thesis of the book is that liberal democracy is the culmination of mankind's ideological evolution and the best conceivable social-political system for fostering freedom and self realization. In his view, liberal democracy is immune to the internal contradictions and irrationalities that ruined earlier forms of government, and people in democratic societies experience maximum fulfillment and are spared the struggle for a better life which is more or less the preoccupation of history. Despite the acclaimed intellectual sophistication of Fukuyama, this paper posits that his argument is not tenable when judged using the practice of democracy in Nigeria, where there are recurrent cases of election fraud, violence, thuggery, violation of the provisions of the constitution with impunity, falsification of election results and intimidation of political opponents. The situation in Nigeria proves that Fukuyama's postulations dwell primarily in the realm of ideas; it has many faulty parts in the real or material world. It is concluded here that Fukuyama's work is more or less an extension of western imperial propaganda geared towards the adoption of strange principles of governance and the capitalist mode of production in Africa. The study depends heavily on secondary sources.*

Keywords: *Democratic project, history, last man*

Introduction

Few books on liberal democracy have provoked as much heated debate as Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*. Described by some commentators as a *magnum opus*, the book presupposes that liberal democracy constitutes the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," and as such constitutes the "end of history." Fukuyama argues that "the most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world's seemingly strong dictatorships, whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian left. And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe" (xiii).

For the purpose of specificity, we situate our discourse within the practice of democracy in Nigeria since 1999 and try to answer such questions as what is democracy? Whose democracy is Fukuyama talking about? Can democracy be conceived differently from culture to culture?

Must the principles and application of democracy be the same in all cultures? Can we have a democratic model which principles are truly globalized? Why is liberal democracy failing in Nigeria? Can there be an African brand of democracy whose ethos is based on African culture? Does the institutionalization of liberal democracy truly mark the end of History? What is the most suitable form of democracy for Africa? Is it not profitable to resuscitate African democracy that was assassinated on the eve of colonial rule? It is hoped that responses to these posers will provide a road map for the adoption of a democracy that would bring about accountable leaders, actively participating citizens, an open society and social justice in Nigeria, all of which will improve the welfare and wellbeing of the people.

The End of History and the Last Man: A Synopsis

The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama's book of thirty-one chapters and an introduction, argues that liberal democracy is the best conceivable socio-political system for fostering freedom and self-actualization. Because he assumes that liberal democracy would not be superseded by a better or higher form of government, Fukuyama maintains that liberal democracy offers the most possible complete and rational satisfaction for any group of people in the world. In his view, liberal democracy is immune to the fundamental internal contradictions and irrationalities that ruined earlier forms of government. According to him, other forms of government, from monarchy to communism to fascism, had failed because they were imperfect vehicles for freedom.

It is important to point out from the onset that what Fukuyama envisaged was not the end of history understood as the lower-case realm of daily occasions and events, but the end of history: an evolutionary process that represents freedom, self-realization in the world. The end he has in mind is in the nature of a telos: more fulfillment than completion or finish. Referring his earlier article entitled "The End of History," Fukuyama writes:

What I suggested had come to an end was not the occurrence of events, even large and grave events, but history: that is, history understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times... Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human societies was not open-ended, but would end when mankind had achieved a form of society that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings. Both thinkers thus posited an "end of history": for Hegel, this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society. This did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end, that important events would no longer happen, or that newspapers reporting would cease to be published. It meant, rather, that there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions have been settled... From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades. And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globes (xii-xiii).

Fukuyama insists that liberal democracy constitutes the end point of mankind ideological evolution and the final form of human government anywhere in the world. He maintains that the

ideals of democracy cannot be improved upon. In substantiating his position, he avers that the world's most developed countries are also its most successful democracies.

As Roger Kimball observes, writing at a time when communism was everywhere in retreat, it was hardly surprising that Fukuyama should have proclaimed the end of the Cold War and unabashed victory or economic and political liberalism. In distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, Fukuyama avers:

What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government

Fukuyama maintains that "most nineteenth-century Europeans thought that progress meant progress toward democracy" (7). He seems to advance this position in the last part of the book when he says without mincing words that "common sense would indicate that liberal democracy has many advantages over its major twentieth century rivals, fascism and communism, while loyalty to our inherited values and traditions would indicate unquestioning commitment to democracy" (287). Again, he claims that "the end of history would mean the end of wars and bloody revolutions. Agreeing on ends, men would have no large causes for which to fight. They would satisfy their needs through economic activity, but they would no longer have to risk their lives in battle. They would, in other words, become animals again, as they were before the bloody battle that began history" (311). He says it more forcefully in the last chapter of the book when he states: "In particular, the virtues and ambitions called forth by war are unlikely to find expression in liberal democracies" (328).

Fukuyama's thesis is influenced by two principal considerations – economic ("Free market") and political ("struggle for recognition"). As a global phenomenon, liberal economic principles – the "free market" – have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed nations and in countries of the Third World that were impoverished by World War II. Based on this analysis, Fukuyama opines that "a liberal revolution in economic thinking has sometimes preceded, sometimes followed, the move toward political freedom around the globe". In a related sense, he argues that technology makes possible the limitless accumulation of wealth, and the satisfaction of an ever-expanding set of human desires. This process, he claims, enhances the homogenization of all human societies, regardless of their divergent historical origins and heterogeneous cultural inheritances. Fukuyama is convinced that if the world is made up of liberal democracies, there would be less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one another's legitimacy. He claims that existing evidence from the past couple of hundred years indicates that liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another.

Fukuyama insists in the last paragraphs of his book that "it is possible that if events continue to unfold as they have done over the past few decades, that the idea of a universal and directional history leading up to liberal democracy may become more plausible to people, and that the relative impasse of modern thought will in a sense solve itself" (338). The implication of this kind of construct is that the values and norms of western democracy should be imbibed by the rest of the world, so that at the end of the day, the principles and application of democracy would be the same in all cultures. When liberal democracy is successfully globalized, the creature that emerges at the end of the process, that is, Fukuyama's "the last man," will be free from "conventional sources of inequality." He adds: "The life of the last man is one of physical

security and material plenty, precisely what Western politicians are fond of promising their electorates” (312). Rather than a thousand shoots blossoming into as many different flowering plants, the last men, Fukuyama insists “will come to seem like a long wagon train strung out along a road” (338). Interestingly, Fukuyama recognizes the fact that “some wagons will be pulling into town sharply and crisply, while others will be bivouacked back in the desert, or else stuck in ruts in the final pass over the mountains.”

Because of our aim in this paper, we will not say everything about *The End of History and the Last Man*. The above brief sketch is only meant to give readers who are yet to read the book an insight into its main thesis. Though it is difficult to remember an article in an intellectual quarterly or a book that made as big a splash as did Fukuyama’s book, we need to be careful in praising his intellectual sophistication because of some obvious limitations that his postulations face in the practice of democracy in Nigeria. As it will be demonstrated presently, Fukuyama’s work is more or less an extension of western capitalist propaganda geared towards the perpetration and expansion of democratic principles and the capitalist mode of production and exchange. We do not need to take for granted Eskor Toyo’s assertion that “the United States of America and some of its West European capitalist allies have found in democracy one of the campaign issues to launching their current effort to sustain and strengthen the hold of neo-colonialism on Africa, Asia and Latin America” (1). It is important to know that Fukuyama was a deputy director of the U. S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and was selling the ideas of the United States to the rest of the world. Little surprising why his work “soon became a slogan to be bruited about in Washington think tanks, the press, and the academy” (Kimball 1). Fukuyama quickly emerged as a celebrity in the United States and in many other places around the world. Kimball avers that: “Rarely has the word brilliant been used with such cheery abandon.” *The End of History and the Last Man* contributed greatly in shaping the intellectual discourse on democracy. On this, Okon Uya asserts:

From the perspective of the twenty-first century, the last quarter of the twentieth century will probably be best remembered and designated by historians as ‘the Age of Democracy’... The Berlin Wall, that noted symbol of the man-made division of the International community into the abode of totalitarianism, on the one hand, and liberal democracy, on the other, has gone into the dust bin of history. Totalitarian regimes, whatever their designations, descriptions and uniforms, have collapsed or are collapsing with such amazing speed that one is left to conclude that they were perhaps gigantic political formations with feet of clay... Liberal democracy has triumphed over other competing systems as the model of good governance and the best guarantee for the development and survival of our human family (Imbua *et al* 568-9).

By the close of the twentieth century, there was virtually no part of the globe that liberal democracy was not hailed as the best form of government with inherent ability to guarantee respect for human rights and social justice among other virtues that are theoretically associated with it. By the close of the twentieth century, there was no country in Africa where the one-party state, once hailed as the panacea for holding in check the rivalries and competing loyalties inherent in ethnically pluralistic societies was still cherished. In the same way, military interventions in government were regarded as an aberration, only justifiable if it was preparatory to the inauguration of democratic regimes. Totalitarian regimes were confronted by “people

power” on the streets of Zaire, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Mali, Zambia, Benin, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Cameroon and so on (509).

We should end this section by stating that the practice of liberal democracy in Nigeria since 1999 suggests that Fukuyama is a disappointing dialectician. The huge disappointment of Nigerians with democracy suggests that Fukuyama’s study is an exercise in Utopianism. With this insight into Fukuyama’s argument, we now turn attention to the democratic project in Nigeria since 1999.

The Democratic Project in Nigeria Since 1999

Due to colonial impositions and the promises of Western liberal democracy, African countries were quick to abandon their own versions of democracy. Liberal democracy was particularly appealing to those whose yearnings for freedom, equality and justice were abused. In the euphoria that followed the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 for instance, Nelson Mandela spoke optimistically of how not only South Africa but the whole continent stood at the threshold of a new era (Meredith 679). Because of its long history of deprivation, degradation, suffering, subjugation and institutionalized injustice based on race, South Africans were pleased when Nelson Mandela was democratically elected in 1994 as the President of South Africa. With the “new birth,” Mandela became one of advocates of liberal democracy in Africa.

In the Nigeria’s case, the swearing-in of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the democratically elected president on 29 May 1999, as well as the inauguration of civilian regimes at the State and Local Government levels was seen as a significant watershed in the chequered history of the nation. It was expected to bring to an end the domination of the Nigerian political space and actual rulership of the country for the greater part of the post-colonial period by the military. Expectations were high that the enthronement of democratic governance at all levels of government on that date will usher in a political culture based on justice, equity, sense of belonging, participation and involvement, tolerance, transparency and accountability in the conduct of the affairs of the nation. Across the nation, people expressed the hope that there would be massive improvement in the welfare and wellbeing of Nigerians marked by radical improvement in political, social and economic growth; health and educational services and infrastructures; a reversal of the poverty, corruption, indiscipline and moral decadence which appeared to have been the norms in the days of military rule (Imbua *et al* 664). In short, because of the optimistic feeling that there was going to be massive improvement in the quality of life of Nigerians, many people expressed satisfaction not only for seeing “the end of history” but even more importantly, for being among the last men, to borrow the elegant phrases of Fukuyama. At this time, except for a few doubting Thomases, the world had come to believe that there was “an inseparable linkage between a democratic polity and the inauguration of a regime of good governance” (Uya 1).

Almost two decades down the democratic road, all now seem to agree that the nation is not only far from the promised land but that the conditions of living are becoming more excruciating by the day. Indeed, it has been correctly observed that:

All around us are still overwhelming evidences of the stark poverty of the many in the midst of the provocative opulence of the few; collapsing health, education, political and economic infrastructures resulting in the increasing pauperization and near elimination of the Nigerian middle class; pollution of values as shown in massive corruption, indiscipline, moral decadence and the resurgence of

dangerous dimensions of ethnicity; insecurity of life and property; and political violence, are still here with us... Yes, although we have certainly not qualified for the status of a failed state... the Nigerian ship of state is adrift and we must certainly find a reliable philosophical anchor for it before we are all drowned. We must summon the political courage to admit that all is not well and that things are indeed 'not getting better' (Imbua *et al* 664-5).

There is no doubt that the capitalist democracy that killed African democracy is failing woefully in Nigeria. It is clearly an understatement to say that Nigeria is passing through one of the most trying periods in its history. All attempts to make policies that are capable of translating the people's dreams of freedom into concrete economic and social realities have been frustrated. Almost two decades after the enthronement of democracy, Nigeria's prospects are bleaker than ever before. It is falling further and further behind several countries of the world, including some in Africa that had look up to Nigeria as the "giant of Africa." In the midst of euphoria and optimism that characterized the golden jubilee of Nigeria's political independence in October 2010, Eskor Toyo chose to bemoan Nigeria at fifty as follows:

Nigeria reminds us of Sampson [the biblical Sampson, the tower of physical strength]. In 1960, as the country, popularly described as the giant of Africa, stood up as a self-governing state, the whole of suffering humanity rose in Unison and cheered a physical giant that was expected to stride forward powerfully towards liberation in all ways, holding the torch of freedom and progress for all of Africa and oppressed nations. From the summit of ecstatic goodwill, the world's opinion has slumped into the vale of despair. The only exception to this sweeping cascade of expectations is the bank and other wealth of its perpetrators which has shot like a rocket from close to nothing in 1960 to millions or billions of naira now ("Project Nigeria" 1).

Like Toyo, many people believe that we are not only still far from our democratic destination but that there is no signal that our democratic practice would benefit the people. At present, the Nigerian society is a grossly parasitic and irresponsible one. The rulers, by and large, feel no responsibility except to enrich themselves individually. The common people see the parasitism and irresponsibility manifested daily in high quarters. There is nothing but anguish brought about by administrations that have come to be in the country and of the society itself since 1999. The common citizens have completely lost confidence in the rulers.

A democracy that is worth its salt should be able to create a citizenry imbued with a strong sense of self reliance and control over their lives in such critical areas as food, shelter, education and health. What has been unfolding in Nigeria is the increasing concentration of wealth in a few hands and the persistence of abject poverty in the masses. In 2000, the President of the World Bank James D. Wolfensohn said:

Poverty amid plenty is the world's greatest challenge. We at the Bank have made it our mission to fight poverty with passion and professionalism, putting it at the centre of all the work we do... Of the world's 6 billion people, 2.8 live on less than 1 dollar a day. Six infants of every 100 do not see their first birth day, and 8 do not survive to their fifth. Of those who do reach school age 9 boys in 100 and 14 girls do not go to primary school ("Foreword." v-vi).

The expectation that liberal democracy will drastically reduce poverty has been betrayed by successive democratic regimes in Nigeria. It has been stated correctly that "poverty is the

principal obstacle to democratic development” and “the future of democracy any where depends on the future of economic development.” The dialectical link between poverty and democracy was aptly captured by Olusegun Obasanjo: “Democracy will thrive when poverty in all its facets, is eliminated or drastically reduced. Poverty, on the other hand, will be on the run when democratic practices and ethos become the order of the day” (qtd in Uya 7). The point cannot be overstressed that democracy cannot take firm roots and flourish in an environment of hunger, poor health, inadequate and misdirected education, poor and inadequate shelter, social injustice and physical insecurity such as we presently have in Nigeria. Poverty alleviation should be seen as a democratic necessity rather than a political programme designed to win votes.

Re-engineering Democracy in Nigeria

The crescendo of liberal democracy in recent years should not be taken to mean that Nigeria, nay Africa had been undemocratic. It is hard to deny that democracy, as instinct and practice, has deep roots in traditional Nigerian society. On this, we will quote Okon Uya at some length:

Governance in pre-colonial societies in Nigeria, whatever the complexity or simplicity of their structures, shared some common democratic traits. These included: an ethos of governance that insisted on the proper balance between power and authority, on the one hand, and service and accountability, on the other; rulers being judged and remaining in power on the basis of the extent to which they served the ‘public good’; decisions often arrived at after extensive debates by the citizenry in open forums and achieved through consensus being binding on all; incumbents of powerful political offices being judged by such characteristics as honesty, integrity and uprightness, and often removed when they violated commonly accepted communal norms; a common acceptance by all, the ruler and the ruled, of the promotion of the welfare of the populace as being the most fundamental *raison d’être* of government which gave governance a moral anchor; and, an innate sense of the equality of all derived from the relative precedence of group over the individual, despite the existence of societal hierarchy. Indeed, what is often described as “African communalism” was no more than the democratic ethos writ large on the African traditional political landscape. In other words, democracy, understood as governance of the people by the people and for the promotion of the welfare of the people, as instinct, value or practice, was not imported into Nigeria, the claims of the defenders of colonialism notwithstanding (Imbua *et al* 570-1).

Democracy was such a cherished value in pre-colonial Nigeria that all societies rated it as the best form of government and thus resisted attempts at abusing its basic ingredients. In his insightful paper, “Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future”, Ali Mazrui identified four goals of democracy to include: to make rulers accountable and answerable for their actions and policies; to make citizens effective participants in choosing those rulers and in regulating their actions; to make the society as open and the economy as transparent as possible; to make the social order fundamentally just and equitable to the greatest number possible (15) One gets a glimpse from Mazrui’s paper that domination/authoritarianism, oppression/repression, exploitation, inequality, injustice and illegitimacy are enemies of democracy.

With courage, Mazrui answers his rhetorical question - “who killed Democracy in Africa?”. In his view, the main culprits in Africa’s democraicide (murder of democracy) are: the magicians who came from the North with the spell cast by Western ways, the soldier who came in from the barracks, the subversive spy who came from the cold under Cold War conditions and the cultural half-caste who came in from Western schools and did not adequately respect African institutions (18-19). In his own account, Uya regards colonialism as the major assassin of democracy in Nigeria. According to him:

Even the most ardent defenders of colonialism and imperialism must concede that colonialism is inherently undemocratic and autocratic... Colonialism undermined, by and large, the democratic ethos prevalent in traditional Nigerian political systems by mistakenly but stridently condemning these systems as despotic, uncivilized and barbaric... (Imbua *et al* 570).

The undemocratic institutions and practices of the colonial period continue to cast shadow on the practice of democracy in Africa today. The colonial chiefs, the fulcrum of the Indirect Rule System through which Britain administered Nigeria, lacked the legitimacy of their forebears and were regarded by the populace as agents for the mediation of colonial policies such as tax collection, recruitment of forced labour and the maintenance of law and order. These agents admired and imbued European ways which they hurriedly used in replacing African democratic values. In the end, ersatz or flag independence came and the colonizers handed over the baton to these same “white washed” Africans whom Sartre has described as “Walking Lies” (Ushie 7). There is no doubt that Nigeria’s colonial past is still too powerfully inscribed in her neo-colonial present. Taking advantage of colonial infrastructure, Nigeria’s “pirates in power,” to borrow Basil Davidson’s elegant phrase, have no regard for the pre-colonial democratic ethos and so treat the masses as slaves or something less. Kwame Nkrumah’s articulation of the helplessness of citizens in a neo-colonial system like Nigeria in most apt: “Neo-colonialism is... the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress” (qtd in Young 44). There is no doubt that Nigeria is a neo-colony. It has been argued that “she is, in fact, one of the most servile neo-colonies in the world. All dictations from Britain, Western Europe, European Union or the United States of America are treated in Nigeria as laws to be simply obeyed. These dictations are adopted as government policies to be applied without question... This country is a land ruled by slaves at heart” (Toyo “From Parasites’ Dictatorship to Real Democracy” 14-5).

One of the most unfortunate things is that “in Nigeria practically everyone including some Professors of political science have taken it for granted that democracy means whatever American and West European propagandists mean by it. Extremely superficial and misleading notion that ‘democracy’ means a constitution allowing for elections, the mere holding of elections and the installation of governments based on those elections has taken root” (Toyo “Democracy” 1). This explains why military regimes were asked to give Nigeria democracy. Nigeria’s “pirates in power,” who are mostly ignorant and dishonest presume that the mere termination of military rule will mean a transition to democracy. As Toyo argues, “this is not only because they are mental slaves of foreign predatory overloads but also because they themselves have the predatory conscience of all wolves and vultures” (“Democracy” 23).

We make bold to say that democracy by merely having an exploitative electo-plutocracy in place is un-African. In such a situation, power belongs not to the “people” that Abraham Lincoln talked about but to a parasitic minority of exploiters sitting on wealth to rule the

“people” in the interest of ever-rising pyramids of wealth for themselves. Exploitative electrocracy, to use Toyo’s words, is a denial of democracy as government of the people, by the people and for the people. We must be careful with the powerful imperialist propaganda for so-called ‘democracy’ today that emanates from the United States and some of its West – European allies by which democracy means the holding of elections. No questions are asked about whether it is only millionaires or those backed by millionaires that can, in fact, dare to contest these elections; whether the elections are rigged or not; what is the role of money power or big ethnic or racial power if the country is multi-ethnic or multi-racial; how discriminatory against the people is the education system which shapes the power to articulate or decide; who manipulates the information system and for what; what are the limits to the access to the law or to authority that most people have; how far the laws of the country operate against the interests of the underprivileged majority; how and in whose interest the government is actually run after election; whether the conditions of politics and election even permit an honest or effective articulation of the interests of the people etc (Toyo 19-20). If questions like the ones raised here are not answered by the system in favour of the “people,” then we cannot talk of democracy. Democracy implies that the government should be in the real interest of the majority of the electors. We cannot have a genuine democracy when the electors are being cheated and fooled. To be a genuine democracy a regime must make the people the owners of the means of living and free them from the exploitative domination of pluto-parasites. We uphold Richard Joseph’s assertion:

It is very important to recognize that democratization is not just about elections for countries that have known authoritarian systems of one sort or the other for decades. Laying the basis for stronger democracy requires much more, whether it involves strengthening the independence of the judiciary or the way the executive behaves, or the role of the media or the emergence of groups in civil society to support the process (Qtd in Imbua *et al* 572).

Authentic democracy must ensure the creation of what Professor B. O. Nwabueze (1993) calls an ordered, stable society which guarantees security for lives and properties of the citizens; the cultivation and inculcation in the citizenry of a “democratic temper,” an attitude of service and trusteeship and of commitment to the welfare of the people, a sense of civic responsibility, a spirit of fair play and tolerance of other people’s opinions and interests; absence of arrogance and arbitrariness; a sense of honest, faithful, selfless, disinterested, impartial and objective service; and lastly, dedicated, selfless, discipline, patriotic, honest and highly motivated leadership, free from the cancer of social indiscipline, ethnic hatreds and jealousies, religious bigotry as well as the tendency to personalize rulership and power.

Experiences from various African countries suggest that unless African democracy is resuscitated capitalist democracy imported from the West will continue to fail in Africa. We agree with Richard Nixon, former President of the United States that “Democracy is not a potted Plant that can be transplanted into any soil” (248); each nation should be allowed to fashion its own democratic project, provided that such a project does not violate the basic democratic norms and guarantees basic political and economic freedom and human rights in all its citizens. There is need to support the view that “the current temptation to prescribe a democratic model for all nations is... wrongheaded and ignores the common sense that borrowed garments, however well tailored, may not always fit properly” (Imbua *et al* 580). Apart from the economy and the polity, societies are also characterized by dominant cultures peculiar to them. The cultural traits peculiar

to capitalism, which capitalist democracy has introduced into Nigeria include individualism, selfishness, greed for wealth, egotism, opportunism, a grabbing and competitive outlook, a consuming appetite for or a virtual worship of material things, especially money, and an exploitative and callous disposition which sees people only as means to be used for one's own self-centered ends (Toyo "Democracy" 11).

Mazrui laments that "unlike both the Japanese and the Turks, post-colonial Africans decided to culturally westernize without economically modernizing. Ours has been the worst of both worlds. That is why Africa needs a cultural rather than a structural adjustment" (17). There is a major disconnect between the imported institutions and the cultural realities in Africa. In addressing the question of "Who killed African Democracy?" Mazrui regrets:

Institutions were inaugurated without reference to cultural compatibilities, and new processes were introduced without respect for continuities. Ancestral standards of property, propriety and legitimacy were ignored. When writing up a new constitution for Africa those elites would ask themselves, 'How does the House of Representatives in the United States structure its agenda? How do the Swiss cantons handle their referendum? I wonder how the Canadian federation would handle such an issue? On the other hand, these African elites almost never asked, 'How did the Banyoro, the Wolof, the Igbo or the Kikuyu govern themselves before colonization?' (17).

Mazrui believes that the pre-colonial ancestors of Africa have cursed post-colonial Africans "because of our apparent contempt for the legacy of our ancestors." He is convicted that the ancestors had declared that "your democracy will smoulder like a dying bush fire, after a drizzle of hate" (17). Edward Wamala Regrets that the resulting democratization process in Africa is largely externally generated, and has not taken full cognizance of the internal cultural dynamics of societies in which these changes are being introduced (440). In the words of the Western Philosopher Edmund Burke, "People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors." Similarly, Jeneth Keightley avers that "When the past is forgotten, its power over the present is hidden from us, and our capacity to influence the future is severely restricted." It is therefore not surprising that despite conferences and programmes initiated to popularize liberal democracy in Nigeria, the much-acclaimed dividends of democracy have remained elusive. Thus, the verdict that "the nation suffers which has no sense of history. Such a nation cannot achieve a sense of purpose or direction or stability, and without them the future is bleak" (Ajayi 40-41) stares us in the face.

The resuscitation of African democracy will require a redefinition of the laws and rules about corruption to make them more culturally viable. Unlike pre-colonial Nigerians who knew the danger of corrupting the political process, their descendants of today celebrate corrupt people. Irrespective of what the apologists of liberal democracy would say, Nigeria seems to be plunging deeper and deeper into the turbulent waters of corruption. A corrupt society, with unfree and unfair political system, cannot be the heart desire of any nation. There is no doubt that many politicians who rig elections and will gladly swear by the Bible/Quran and go on to perjure themselves would have refused to swear on the gun or cutlass in the pre-colonial days.

Conclusion

Based on the travails of democracy in Nigeria, this paper interrogated Fukuyama much noised about propaganda that liberal democracy is the best conceivable social-political system

for fostering freedom and that people in democratic societies will enjoy maximum fulfillment. We argue in this paper that the recurrent cases of election fraud, violence, thuggery, violation of the provisions of the constitution with impunity among other vices negate Fukuyama's postulations and optimism. The promise that liberal democracy will implant a culture of justice and equality, sense of belonging, participation and involvement, and tolerance is yet to be realized in Nigeria where the struggle to survive has become more difficult than it was before 1999. The foregoing analysis shows that Fukuyama's thesis that liberal democracy is the solution to the struggle for recognition and to be part of the decision-making process has proven untenable in Nigeria. The experience of Nigerians under liberal democracy is too distant from the picture he painted of the victorious "last man."

There is need to be careful with "democrats" that are products of fraudulent electoral processes; democrats who boast openly that victory is a "do or die" affair. As Wamala observes, "In order to come to power or retain it, political parties have had to resort to Machiavellian strategies. Acting on the notorious principle that the end justifies the means, political parties in the modern state have drained political practice of all ethical considerations. Yet such considerations had been a key feature of traditional political practice. As the traditional values that are thrown overboard were the guiding mechanism of consensus formation, so what we are left with are materialistic considerations that foster the welfare not of society at large, but of certain suitably aligned individuals and groups (441). Usually, this is done through imposition of candidates through a dubious arrangement euphemistically referred to as consensus. Modern consensus does not reflect the view and aspirations of the "people." In Nigeria, many of the "pirates in power" stole the people's mandate through consensus by a few king-makers. Rather than working for the welfare and wellbeing of the "people", they spend their days in office to accumulate wealth for themselves and their supporters in the party; since the party replaces the "people" (Wamala 440). Party members do not really have loyalty to the people whom they are supposed to represent; rather, their loyalty is to the party that ensured their success in the elections. To think that there can be a democratic polity in an undemocratic economy with an undemocratic culture is a fantasy, which Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* represents.

We conclude by insisting that it is becoming clear that the multi party system of politics that is currently being operated in Nigeria; though, of course, better than the accursed military dictatorships of a few years ago, does not necessarily ensure a suitable form of democracy. Thus, Nigeria should replace liberal democracy with African democracy, which was inclusiveness and sensitive to the needs and aspiration of the people. We end this discourse in the words of Kwasi Wiredu:

The liberation struggles are now all won, but the philosophical problem of violence remains in Africa... Much of the problem, in my opinion, is due to the kind of democracy being sought to be implemented in Africa. Trying to imitate majoritarian democracy in the conditions of Africa's ethnic stratification, which, at best, is what is being done, is a tragic experiment from which Africa can hardly expect anything but the opposite of salvation (19).

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