



## Boko Haram Insurgency: Implications for Nigeria's Socio-Economic Development

**Kalu, Ifeanyichukwu Innocent Ph.D<sup>1</sup> and Otobo, Perearau<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Public Administration Department, Abia state polytechnic, Aba, Abia State. Nigeria | Email: [anyikalu@yahoo.com](mailto:anyikalu@yahoo.com) | Phone: +2348037749801

<sup>2</sup>Department of Business Education, Isaac Jasper Boro Collage of Education, Sagbama, Bayelsa State. Nigeria | Email: [fancyot4u@yahoo.com](mailto:fancyot4u@yahoo.com)

**Abstract:** This paper examined the implications of Boko Haram insurgency on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. The country has been in security dilemma, especially going by the deadly, ferocious and unrelenting manner which internal terrorists known as Boko Haram has held the nation hostage. Indeed, the threat posed by the group is undermining the existence of Nigeria as one sovereign political territory. This has led to increased number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). This study adopted ex-post facto method of analysis and elaborated on the nature of this sect and implications for Nigeria's socio-economic development while relying on Frustration Aggression Theory as a guide in the study. The study revealed that in spite of government efforts to address this security challenges in the country, the rate of insurgency and insecurity is still disturbing. The activities of the Boko Haram sect have negatively affected the socio-economic development of the country. In spite of the significant progress made against Boko Haram, the use of military force has not completely eliminated the sect. It was therefore, recommended in this study among others that a blend of diplomacy, intelligence and enlightenment should be adopted to counter the insurgency.

**Key words:** Boko Haram, Insurgency, Development, Socio-economic

Published by  
Africa Research Corps Network (ARCN)

in Collaboration with  
International Academic Journal for Global Research (iajgr) Publishing (USA)



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:   

© 2019. Kalu, Ifeanyichukwu Innocent Ph.D and Otobo, Perearau. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/>), permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

## Introduction

Globally, the nature of violent conflicts has changed dramatically in recent decades. The Predominant form of violent conflict has evolved from inter-state wars to Intra-state or civil wars. These current forms of violence usually involve non-state actors such as rebels, gangs and organized crime (UNOCHA, 2018). In Nigeria's security situation has remained pathetic especially in the last decade of civilian rule. Just like in the Hobbesian state of nature where nobody in the country is safe from the attacks of terrorists, kidnappers, armed gangs and militants. In Nigeria today, there is a general feeling of uncertainty and anxiety as well as lack of confidence on the security agencies to deliver their statutory responsibility. More worrisome is the activities of the dreaded Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram. This group has caused a lot of havoc not only to the people and government of Nigeria but also to the international community. Up to date, thousands of people have been killed and two million others forced to flee their homes in northeastern Nigeria since Boko Haram launched a campaign in 2009, aimed at forming a breakaway state. The sect attacks churches, mosque, schools, markets, motor parks and houses. This armed group has also kidnapped thousands of adults and children.

For instance, in April 2014 the Boko Haram sect abducted 276 Nigerian schoolgirls from the town of Chibok. More than one-third of those girls remain unaccounted for. Similarly, 110 schoolgirls were abducted after armed fighters stormed the Government Science and Technical College in Dapchi, in the northeastern state of Yobe, on February 19, 2018 (Aljazeera.News, 2018).

According to Awojobi (2014), despite the security measure taken by the federal government of Nigeria to checkmate the heinous crime of the sect against humanity, as well as the formation of anti-terrorism movement called Civilian JTF" to complement the effort of the government counter terrorism strategy insecurity still persist especially in the North-East part of Nigeria. This contradicts Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari who recently said the era of Boko Haram violence "is gradually drawing to end".

The latest kidnapping and other nefarious activities of the sect has not only raised questions about the armed group's prevailing threat in northeast Nigeria but also slowed investment and stilted economic growth and job creation. Over 70 percent of the country's estimated 160 million people live below the poverty line. (El-Rufai: 2012). The Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has almost crippled economic activities in the area (Ewetan and Urhie, 2014). The crisis according to Allen, Lewis and Matfess (2014), is growing into one of the largest areas of violence in Africa, and a major conflict in global terms.

The task of this paper therefore is to examine the implications of Boko Haram insurgency to Nigeria's national development.

*Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari on December, 24, 2015 told the BBC that the Nigerian military had met an end-of-year deadline for routing out the Boko Haram militant sect when he claimed the insurgency had been "technically defeated." Hilary Matfess, Quartz Africa, December 29, 2015 Nigeria.*

## Methodology

Since this study is more or less a qualitative research, the study adopted ex-post factor method of analysis. Citing Kerlinger (1973), Ndiyo (2015) noted that an ex post facto research is a systematic empirical inquiry in which the scientist has no direct control of the independent variables. Inferences about relations among variables are therefore made

without a current interaction between the independent and dependent variables.

The data gathered for this study were qualitatively analyzed and explained within the context of the problem under investigation.

### **Theoretical Framework.**

This study adopts Relative Deprivation Theory to explain the Security challenges caused by Boko Haram Insurgency in the North Eastern part of Nigeria and how it affects Nigerian social-economic Development. This theory was propounded in 1939 by John Dollard and his research associates as part of efforts to link socio-political and economic inequalities in the society to rebellions and insurrections. In an attempt to explain aggression, this theory points to the difference between what people feel they want or deserve to what they actually get (Feierabends, Feierabends and Nesvold 1969:256-257). Thus, the theory points to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to others and realize that they have less of what they believe themselves to be entitled than those around them.

The phrase frustration implies feeling annoyed and impatient by the people because larger percentage of them felt that they have not achieved their sets goals. The economic situation of Nigeria with arising consequence coupled with corruption, 'fictitious facts and ignorance', 'failure of good governance and good leadership', 'social injustice, marginalization and neglect' and lack of development among others which have negatively reflect on the people and thereby lead to frustration on people's part to the extent of instigating militancy among other social vices particularly among the youths (Ndi-igbo Unity Forum, 2013).

The theory explains why the youths are always taking to violence. According to the deprivation theory, aggression is always a consequence of frustration" and "frustration always lead to aggression. "The poor are led to violence owing to their relative deprivation and needs" (Odumosu 1999 cited in Awojobi 2014). Frustrations, lack of income, unemployment have prompted the youths in the northern Nigeria to become foot soldiers of Boko Haram (Awojobi, 2014).

As individual and group- based theory of aggression, the relative deprivation theory argues that when expectation outstrips achievement regardless of the absolute levels of economic consumption or the provision of political rights, frustration is generated. In Nigeria, there is a general perception of marginalization by a section of the people in areas of government development policies, political patronage, and these are triggers of disaffection, resentment, and revolt (Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpan-Robaro 2013). This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves (Gilligan, 2011). Thus, the collective frustration turns to anger and violence (Davies 1962, as cited in Dinneya, 2006:47).

By application, this theory assists us to trace the historical antecedence of conflicts, agitations and frequent rise of individuals and groups against the Nigerian government. Drawing from the assumptions of Relative Deprivation Theory, we argue that, most of the apparent causes of internal insecurity such as kidnapping, rape, bombing, including youth violence and criminality in the North-East Nigeria can be linked to increasing economic decline, income inequality, unemployment and hopelessness due to government failures to addressing critical challenges to development in many parts of the country. This is because, when any political

environment faces turbulence, it may have grave consequences for the state if concerted efforts are not made to checkmate the situation.

### **Overview of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria**

Historically, Boko Haram (which translates loosely as 'Western education is forbidden' in Hausa) was established as a Muslim youth organization in 1995 under the name "Shabab". However, in 2002, the radical leader Mohammed Yusuf took leadership of the group and turned it into a radical Islamic group named Boko Haram (Oyewole, 2013). According to Murtada (2013 as cited in Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu 2015), the real name of Boko Haram was Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lid da'wati wal-jihad, (congregation of the people of Tradition for proselytism and Jihad). Until 2009, the organization was rather peaceful compared to their actions further along the way. Initially, the sect's leadership did not call for violence; its followers engaged in periodic clashes with security during its formative years. Between 2002 and 2009, civilians were not the main target and the group mostly attacked police stations and government buildings (BBC, May 15, 2013). Boko Haram aspires to create an Islamic state in Nigeria (Leigh, 2011).

"Boko Haram" – has never been a monolithic organisation. It has always been made up of several factions, and recently these divisions may have become sharper. The clearest rift is between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Shekau became Boko Haram's leader back at the time of the launch of the insurgency in 2009 and is still its most recognisable figure both within and outside Nigeria (Zenn, 2016). This has made it hard for the Nigerian authorities to detect and defeat them. Boko Haram emerged under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau with a more militant agenda and brutal tactics. Since then, there has been an escalation of attacks by insurgents and a growing response by the Nigerian military. As the violence has concentrated in the northeast, Borno State has become a de facto war zone.

The group's tactics have shifted and diversified from attacks on government installations to bombings, robberies, kidnappings, assaults on churches and mainstream Muslim targets, and most recently the occupation of villages and towns, indicating greater confidence and capacity. Boko Haram has also benefited from state corruption and has been able to infiltrate the government, the army and the security services.

In 2009, the activities of Boko Haram had transformed from a local peace militia into a violent group, after the government attacked the members of the group in some major cities of northern Nigeria, which led to five days violent clashes between the group members and the Nigerian forces and resulted in killing the sect leader, Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, and more than 700 other people (Blanchard, 2014 as cited in Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu 2015).

The radical Islamic sect called Boko Haram has been terrorizing the country (Nigeria) since 2009 by bombing public facilities, schools, churches, markets, Police Headquarters and other places etc. making citizens and non-citizens life nasty and brutish. People sleep with one open, turning them to become refugees in their own country. Since July 2013, Boko Haram has been a proscribed terrorist organization (US department of State, 2013). The most pitiable fact is that most of those suicide bombers are teenagers which can be summarily belief to be the resultant effect of brainwashing ( Dauda, 2014).

Even though the group started out as a purely Islamic group, the disposition of the group became questionable for three reasons. Firstly, the sect is not only out for non-Muslims, it is fighting the government as well. This is evident in the group's bombings of the United Nation (UN) House in Abuja and other government owned structures. Secondly, the group has not spared some prominent Muslims, as they had attacked mosques and killed Islamic religious leaders in the past (The Punch Newspaper, 2012:21)

### **Efforts by Government to address the Boko Haram Insurgency**

Since the emergence of the dread sect as a violent group, the Nigerian government has taken some steps to address the situation. The Nigerian government's conceptualization of the challenge is awed and thus, the increased military pressure on Boko Haram. Yet there is still a long way from restoring stability; and the government cannot afford to consider a military defeat of the sect as a resolution to the crisis in Nigeria's north east.

Allen, Lewis and Matfess (2014) observed that in May 2013, the government declared a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. In its current phase since July, the insurgency has mimicked the tactics of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, declaring a local caliphate and shifting approach from guerrilla-style attacks to the conventional capture and consolidation of territory.

The former administration of President Goodluck Jonathan had offered assurances that much is being done overtly and behind the scenes to blunt the offensive. Meanwhile, many Nigerians in southern states and quite a number of politicians in the capital of Abuja dismiss Boko Haram as a regional skirmish, rooted in local conditions and confined to their catchment area (Allen, Lewis and Matfess, 2014).

According to Matfess (2015), since coming into office in May 2015, Buhari has accelerated the Nigerian government's response to the Boko Haram insurgency, moving the military headquarters for the effort to Maiduguri, the north eastern city where Boko Haram was founded. The new strategy re-emphasized the importance of the Multi-National Joint Task Force, and successfully reclaiming a number of communities formerly under Boko-Haram's control. The revitalized response was received warmly by Nigerians; having claimed thousands of lives in six years, the insurgency is a near-constant source of media coverage and speculation in Nigeria today.

However, Matfess (2015) maintained that the current coverage of the Islamic militants portrays it as a territory-seeking insurgency, instead of recognizing that this tactic was a result of being pushed out of the country's urban centers in a previous military push under former president Goodluck Jonathan.

The evidence that Boko Haram is now engaging in 'hit and run' attacks in city centers, including suicide bombings on soft targets, is less evidence of the decline of the sect, but rather of a return to its previous tactics. This means that, rather than claiming a 'technical' victory, the Nigerian government should be recalibrating its response to engage in urban operations. This necessarily complicates the military's ability to undermine the sect Matfess (2015).

### **Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigeria's Socio-Economic Development**

The insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria has cost the country a lot of human resources. Of course, development does not take place through evolution. It is human beings that undertake developmental projects. Development thrives in only a peaceful

environment and conflict/unfriendly environment is thus harmful to sustainable national development. No doubt, Nigeria is blessed with abundant human, and natural resources (Ali, 2013:11). According to Awojobi (2014), the Boko Haram insurgency has led to the loss of over five thousand six hundred and twenty-eight persons between 2009 and 2015. These include intellectuals, expatriates, business moguls' security operatives, students etc (see table 1 below).

Similarly, Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno state added that the insurgency has led to the deaths of almost 100,000 persons, based on estimates by community leaders in the state over the years. This casualty figure is the highest ever provided by any government official from a state where remote areas which witness attacks by the insurgents are difficult to reach (Shettima, 2018).

Shettima (2018) added that two million, one hundred and fourteen thousand (2,114,000) persons have become internally displaced as at December of 2016, with five hundred and thirty-seven thousand, eight hundred and fifteen (537,815) in separate camps; 158,201 are at official camps that consists of six centres with two transit camps at Muna and Customs House, both in Maiduguri (Shettima, 2018).

In addition, there are 379,614 IDP'S at 15 satellite camps comprising Ngala, Monguno, Bama, Banki, Pulka, Gwoza, Sabon Gari and other locations in the state. 73,404 persons were forced to become refugees in neighbouring countries with Niger having 11,402 and Cameroon having 62,002. The insurgency has also produced 52,311 orphans who are separated and unaccompanied. We have 54,911 widows who have lost their husbands to the insurgency and about 9,012 have returned back to various communities of Ngala, Monguno, Damboa, Gwoza and Dikwa," the governor said (Shettima, 2018).

**Table 1: summary of selected cases of casualties caused by Boko Haram insurgency between 2009 and 2015.**

S/N	YEAR	NUMBER OF ATTACKS	DEATH TOLL	NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOUNDED
1	2009 - 2010	8	409	Unreported
2	2011 - 2012	60	214	123
3	2013 - 2013	35	693	136
4	2014 - 2015	51	4308	513

Source: Awojobi (2014).

**Table 2: Summary of selected cases of casualties caused by Boko Haram insurgency between 2009 and 2015.**

S/N	YEAR	NUMBER OF ATTACKS	DEATH TOLL	NUMBER OF PEOPLE WOUNDED
1	2016	87	1137	1326
2	2017	81	626	349

*N/B 2017 data does not include November and December casualties.*

Source: compiled by the researcher

The data in Tables 1 and 2 above illustrate graphically the high level of insecurity in Nigeria from 2009 to 2017, and this situation has not improved but rather it is getting worse. The worsening security situation in the country has caused enormous loss of life and property and created general atmosphere of fear and social tension in the country. This has the possibility of influencing negatively both local and foreign direct investment.

In addition, Tochukwu (2013), noted that since Boko Haram resumed its operations in 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nigeria has plummeted, owing to the political instability the country has faced. Citing World Investment Report (WIR), Tochukwu noted that FDI flows into Nigeria dropped 21.3 percent in just one year- from \$8.9 billion in 2011 to \$7 billion in 2012.

Again, the insurgency in the northern part of the country has consumed not only human and material resources but also deprived the country of huge amount of money which would have been used for developmental purposes. According to Awojobi (2014), aside the human cost in the Boko Haram insurgency, the atrocities of the sect have socioeconomic implications, especially in the northeast where Boko Haram has dominance. The economic, social and psychological costs of the insurgency cannot be quantified. Commercial activities in the northeast have been reduced because of the unprecedented attacks by the sect. Banks, markets and shops do not open regularly due to the fear of the coordinated attacks from Boko Haram. Citing Okereocha (2012), Awojobi (2014), observed that human capital and investors drain is hampering economic development in the northeast this is due to the attacks on banks, markets, parks and government departments. The attacks on these commercial areas have led to the migration of people to other parts of the country.

For instance, major markets in the North-East especially in Maiduguri have been seriously affected as hundreds of shop owners, especially Southerners are said to have closed their businesses and left the troubled city. About half of the 10,000 shops and stalls in the Maiduguri market were said to have been abandoned by traders who have fled the city (Shiklam, 2012 as cited in Awojobi, 2014).

The never-ending attacks by Boko Haram in North East Nigeria have also affected banking activities in the affected states. For instance, the working duration of most commercial banks in the affected areas hit by Boko Haram bombings has been reduced from eight hours to three hours. In Maiduguri, Borno state, where the sect originated, the frequent bombings and clashes between Boko Haram and the security agents have weighed down seriously on the commercial and businesses activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly crumbled while many people have fled the state (Awojobi, 2014).

Obaremi (2014 as cited in Awojobi, 2014) captured the scenario when he opined that economic affairs in the north is already depleting due to a massive departure of people and financial institutions from the northern region. But if the government delays in the implementing comprehensive plans to tackle insecurity from its roots, then not only will the northern region be economic desolation, the country as a whole risk losing billions of dollars in foreign direct investment. In addition, the business activities of telecom operators have not been left out from the attacks of Boko Haram. For instance, some telecom masts belong to some major mobile telephone operators were destroyed by Boko

Haram and the banning of telephone services by the military affected the income generation of some of the mobile phone operators.

Dauda (2014) added that Boko Haram has not only led to closure and or abandonment of people's business activities within the state but also led to migration of people from the state as well as reduction of people's patronage of products from Northern Region because of rumour that members of Boko Haram are planning to send poisonous products from their region to other parts of Nigeria. Dauda (2014) further observed that 97 percent of businesses have been shot down because of security challenges in the area while those who manage to operate had to retrench their workers or cut down the numbers of hours of its operations. This has cost the Nigerian economy N1.3 trillion (\$6 billion).

Socially, the activities of the sect have created the impression especially on some non-Muslims that all Muslims are fundamentalist. This is evident on the rejection of deployment of some National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) members to serve in the Northern part of Nigeria.

Calculating the cost implications of the insurgency in the North East Shettima (2018) noted that based on the post-insurgency Recovery and Peace Building Assessment, RPBA, report on the north-east which was jointly validated by the World Bank, the European Union, the Presidency and the six states of the north-east, Boko Haram has inflicted damages to the tune of \$9 billion on the region. the destruction in Borno State amounts to \$6 billion.

Ewetan and Urhie (2014) summarized the various ways in which Insecurity in Nigeria has retarded socio economic development in Nigeria to include:

Social dislocation and population displacement

Social tensions and new pattern of settlements which encourages Muslims/Christians or members of an ethnic group moving to Muslim/Christian dominated enclaves.

Heightens citizenship question which encourages hostility between "indigenes" and "settlers".

Dislocation and disruption of family and communal life.

General atmosphere of mistrust, fear, anxiety and frenzy

Dehumanization of women, children, and men especially in areas where rape, child abuse and neglect are used as instruments of war.

Deepening of hunger and poverty in the polity.

Discourages local and foreign investment as it makes investment unattractive to business people.

Halts business operations during period of violence and outright closure of many enterprises in the areas or zones where incidence of insecurity is rife and are on daily occurrence.

Increases security spending by business organizations and governments.

Migration of people from area or region where there is prevalence of insecurity.

## **Conclusion**

The Boko Haram activities have indeed affected the socio-economic development of Nigeria. The high incidence of bombings and attacks on security building, infrastructure,

schools, churches, markets, etc is the one which has greatly impacted negatively on economic and national development of the country. It is obvious that Boko Haram sect only seeks to gain recognition by influencing government decision, policies and programs but does not seek to overthrow the government in power to directly control resources endowed in Nigeria.

The Boko Haram activities have turned out to become a thorn in the flesh of the Nigeria government and have over the years become a log in the wheel of the operation and progress of the country.

During the course of this study, some series of attacks and bomb explosions conducted in the Northern region of Nigeria which the sect has effectively carried out over the years. Some of the major attacks include; the bombing of telecommunication most in some northern states of Nigeria, massacre of corps members, the attacks of primary and secondary schools, where several pupils, students and teachers were killed, prison tracks and others attacks on security agencies, as well as bombing of places of worship while worship are going on.

The greatest of these scenarios is the amount of money spent on security issues and other related matters in order to meet the challenges of the present threat in the country. These funds can be best utilized in providing infrastructure and quality education, there are no good roads, electricity and other social amenities, yet the federal government has to raise funds to take striving towards building the nation, Boko Haram menace is crumbing all effort. The root of Boko Haram insurgency is poor governance and this often leads to poverty, illiteracy and unemployment among the youths. The analysis of findings of this study confirms that Boko Haram insurgency affects national development negatively in almost all ramifications as often as it occurs.

Despite the massive security budget of Nigerian government, it has been able to halt the Boko Haram attacks. Coercion has obviously failed to incapacitate Boko Haram terrorists' campaign against the country. Rather it helped to strengthen its capacity prevention and mitigation becomes the best option available for now.

### **Recommendations**

As a road map to solving the security threat posed by Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the following recommendations are hereby put forward

- I. A blend of diplomacy and negotiation, police strategies, intelligence work and infrastructural development should be used to counter, contain or co-opt Boko Haram. It also involved addressing the cause of insurgency in Nigeria.
- II. Again, government should adopt measures to standardize the leadership of Nigeria as well as eliminate corruption embezzlement of public fund. This is because Nigeria's main problems still focus on and leadership and corruption. Government at all level must eschew corruption in the fighting against criminality and insecurity.
- III. Furthermore, there is the need for collaboration between the people and the security agencies. This is anchored on the premise that the multi-ethnic nature of Nigeria is regarded as one the major challenges facing the security situation in the country. Considering the level of ethno-religious consciousness of Nigeria, one may be constrained to state that Nigeria is not yet ready to tackle the issues of Boko Haram menace in the north. The entire Nigerian and security agents should work in

- cooperation to fight war against terrorism by given reliable information and exposing the perpetrators of crime and people funding the Boko Haram sect.
- IV. Similarly, government should embark on poverty alleviation programs that will impact positively to the lives of citizen in Nigerians youths and this poses a serious risk to a Nigerian society. The magnitude of the danger which youths' unemployment poses to the society. Unemployment causes frustration, dejection, desperation, aggression and even terrorism. If more youths are employed, it automatically depletes the army of youths available for recruitment into various criminal activities and terrorism, the reduction of youth unemployment will translate into reduction in crime, terrorism and also promote sustainable development.
  - V. In addition, government should draw attention to education system northern part of Nigerian in order to reduce illiteracy rate, if attention is not given to education this will encourage youths to drop out of the school to join Boko Haram sect.
  - VI. More so, Security agencies generally must be empowered, motivated, adequately mobilized and train to combat criminality and insecurity to the barest minimum.
  - VII. Finally, top religious leaders in the north also have a great role to play in solving the problem of Boko Haram insurgency. Therefore, respected clergy, imams and other religious leaders should make strong efforts to teach their larger followers that their religion does not suppose to be killing of one person by another. Religious leaders should also preach against reprisal attacks, both Christian and Muslim leaders should work hand in hand to preach and teach love, peaceful coexistence as well as the similarities in the both religious.

## References

- Achumba, I. C., Ighomereho, O. S., and Akpan-Robaro, M. O. M. (2013). "Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, 4(2), 79-99.
- Ali, A. D. (2013). "Security and Economic Development in Nigeria since 1960" *Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 2(6), 1-7.
- Allen, N; Lewis, P.M and Matfess, H. (2014). "The Boko Haram insurgency, by the numbers" October 6, 2014 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-boko-haram-insurgency-by-the-numbers/?utm\\_term=.16b6d769bcb](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-boko-haram-insurgency-by-the-numbers/?utm_term=.16b6d769bcb) [accessed date December, 2017].
- Aljazeera News (2018). "Nigerian Schoolgirls Missing" <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/110-nigerian-schoolgirls-missing-attack-minister-180225171154082.html> [ accessed date November, 2017].
- Awojobi, O. (2014). "International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research" *Innovative Space of Scientific Research Journals* Vol. 11 / 1 Oct. 2014, pp. 144-150 <http://www.ijisr.issr-journals.org/> [accessed date Feb 06, 2018].
- Dinneya, G. (2006). *Political economy of democratization*; Lagos: Concept Publications.
- Duda, M. (2014). "The Effect of Boko Haram Crisis on Socio-Economic activities in Yobe State; Vol. 1/04, 251-257.
- El-Rufai, N.A. (2012). "Nigeria: The challenges of internal insecurity and implication for National Development". A speech delivered at the annual Revision public lecture of

- Obafemi Awolowo University Muslim Graduate Association of Nigeria (UNIFEMCA), Ile-Ife, Osun State Nigeria on Saturday, 19th May 2012.
- Ewetan, O.O and Urhie, E (2014). "Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria" *Journal of Sustainable Development Studies* ISSN 2201-4268 Volume 5, Number 1, 2014, 40-63.
- Feierabends, I.K, Feierabends .R. and Nesvold, B.A. (1969). "Social Changes and Political Violent: Cross National Patterns" in Graham, H T and Ted Robert Gurr ed.(1969). *The History of Violence in America*. New York: New York Press.
- Leigh, K. (2011,). "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Al- Qaeda's New Friend in Africa?" *Time Magazine*. August 31, 2011  
<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2091137,00.html>  
[accessed date August 7, 2014,]
- Matfess, H. (2015). "Nigeria is winning the battle with Boko Haram but it is still losing the war" December 29, 2015 Quartz Africa Nigeria. <http://qz.com/582933/nigeria-is-winning-the-battle-with-boko-haram-but-it-is-still-losing-the-war/2/4> [accessed date december, 2017].
- Ndi-Igbo Unity Forum, (2013) *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, Volume 3, Issue 11, November 2013 6 ISSN 2250-3153 [www.ijsrp.org](http://www.ijsrp.org) [accessed date January 2018]. Ndiyo, N. A. (2015). *Fundamentals of Research in Behavioural Science and Humanities*. Calabar: Excel Publishers.
- Onaiyekan, J.O. (2012). "Onaiyekan condemns Muslim Christian extremists", *Punch Newspaper* <http://punchng.com/news/onaiyekan-condemns-muslim-christian-extremists/> [accessed on 20 October 2014].
- Oyewole, S. (2013). "Boko Haram and the challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror". *Defense & Security Analysis, Volume 29(3)*, pp.253-262  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.820968> [accessed date August 7, 2014].
- Shettima, K. (2018). "Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in Borno State, Experiences and Lessons for a Multiparty, Multiethnic and Multireligious Nigeria", *Premium times*, 2018 Tuesday, February 13, 2018  
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/223399-shocking-revelation-100000-killed-two-million-displaced-boko-haram-insurgency-borno-governor-says.html>. [accessed date March 2018].
- Shuaibu, S.S; Salleh, M.A and Shehu, A.Y. (2015). "The Impact of Boko Haram on Nigerian National Security" *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, Vol 5 (6) 254-266
- Tochukwu, A. (2013). "Boko Haram and its Economic Consequencies" *fairobservers.com* [accessed date august 2017].
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs "Nigeria: Humanitarian Dashboard (January - December 2017)" Published on 29 Jan 2018  
<https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-humanitarian-dashboard-january-december-2017> [accessed date September 11, 2018].
- Zenn, J. (2016). "Making sense of Boko Haram's different factions: Who, how and why?" <https://africanarguments.org/2016/09/20/making-sense-of-boko-harams-different-factions/> [accessed date August 17, 2018].