

# EFFECTS OF INSURGENCY AND INSECURITY ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF SELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS IN YOBE STATE

**Hafsat Ahmad Abubakar (PhD) & Ali Mustapha**

Department of General Studies, Federal Polytechnic Damaturu, Yobe State.

**Abstract:** *The Boko-Haram insurgency has affected livelihoods in the Northeast in all ramifications. This study reviewed scholarly submissions on the drivers and impact of the insurgency in the area. The outcome of the review showed that the insurgency is driven mainly by poverty, religious extremism, and politics. Equally, the insurgency has affected rural livelihoods entirely and has exacerbated food insecurity, unemployment, and poverty. This is because critical infrastructure like schools, hospitals, markets, and electricity/telecommunication facilities have been largely destroyed, and residents of some communities are still displaced. Hence, to better the livelihood of the people in communities where normalcy has been restored, there is the need to promote agriculture and trade by securing the communities and enhancing access to affordable agricultural inputs.*

**Keywords:** *insurgency, rural development, sustainable livelihood, North-East Nigeria.*

## 1. Introduction

The North East Region of Nigeria has a great potential for economic development as enshrined in its vast land mass, natural resource endowment, and population among others. The region is made up of six states, namely; Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. It covers approximately 284,646 square kilometres which represents about 30.8 percent of the nation's land mass (Dlakwa, 2004). According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2019), the area's population is a little over 26 million inhabitants and accounts for about 12% of the total population of the country. Politically, 14.47% of the nation's 774 Local Government Areas are situated in the region. However, this potential has not ascended the region to the required height in terms of development, as it remains one of the less developed regions in Nigeria (RPCA, 2016). In terms of poverty, 71.9% of the people are wallowing in income poverty, while the multidimensional poverty incidence was 0.47 (NBS, 2019). Also, concerning the quality of life, the region's average Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.38, which is less than the average national score of 0.521 (UNDP, 2018). Different reasons are adduced to be responsible for the back-wardness

situation of the region. The region is among the world's most unstable ecologically due to the extreme effects of environmental degradation, particularly deforestation and desertification (Nicholson et al., 1998). The emergence of the Boko-Haram insurgency has further degraded this fragile economic and ecological system for over a decade, which unleashed violence across the region and beyond. As a consequence of the insurgency and counter-insurgency measures undertaken at national and regional levels, a large number of the inhabitants were killed, while millions were displaced from their homes to live as Internally Displaced Persons and refugees in neighbouring countries like the Niger republic, Chad, and Cameroon (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Globally, armed conflict slows down development and weakens its basis (Sheriff & Ipinmoye, 2015). Only a nation that prioritizes human security can achieve sustainable development. This is due to the importance of human security in achieving sustainable development (Ewalefoh, 2019). A guiding principle of sustainable development is achieving human development goals while preserving the capacity of natural systems to supply the natural resources and ecosystem services that are essential to the economy and society (Mensah, 2019). Developments are considered sustainable when it satisfies current requirements without jeopardizing the capacity of future generations to satisfy their wants (Emas, 2015). Therefore, the growing concern about insecurity in Nigeria inhibits investment (both domestic and foreign), poses a serious threat to the protection of lives and property, and hinders the achievement of sustainable development (Ukwayi & Anam, 2017). Shehu & Abba (2020) contend that when individuals lose their lives and means of support, disasters worsen poverty and turn back development. Similar to this, a lack of resources makes people more vulnerable and raises their chance of suffering as a result of being exposed to violence.

The rural communities in the region are mostly affected and ravaged by the insurgents. Unfortunately for the region, this important segment makes up 60% of its population (UNDP, 2016), and their livelihood and sustenance largely (80-90%) depend on agriculture, particularly crop production, fisheries, and the raising of livestock (FAO, 2016). The combined efforts of the Nigerian military and its neighbouring counterparts to exterminate the *Boko-Haram* insurgents from the region in 2015, were resisted by the group and as a result, a lot of rural communities were made desolate due to the enormity of the destruction in retaliation. This is how the northeast's rural areas came to be in such a deplorable state (Thurston, 2016). The insurgents have destroyed schools, hospitals, bridges, and other critical rural infrastructure. The security situation in the region escalated North in 2018 because of the resurgence of the insurgents' attack after about three years of reduced activities, and this has substantially jeopardised the likelihood of attaining stability and socio-economic development in the region (Granville, 2020). Maclean (2018) claims that because of the frequent assaults and suicide bombs, the military has prioritised protecting metropolitan areas over protecting rural areas, leaving the latter with

scant protection.

Today, apart from the over 20,000 lives claimed by the conflict, most of whom are from rural areas, the conflict significantly destroyed physical infrastructure, disrupted social services, and dislocated social cohesion among the people (World Bank, 2015). This unpleasant situation has displaced over two million people in terms of internal displacement, refugees, and returnees (UNHCR, 2017). These people flee their homes, living behind most of their productive assets, like farms, livestock, and other financial capital. As people leave villages and many are left alone, decreased interconnectedness has had a severe impact on the economy. Because of the limited mobility of people, commodities, and services due to damaged infrastructure, ongoing terrorism, and restricted borders has severely hampered trade. As important commercial routes became inaccessible, the volume of trade drastically decreased.

With the remarkable successes gained over the *Boko-Haram* in recent times, the government of Nigeria and other donor agencies has established recovery and stabilisation programmes as part of the Northeast rebuilding and development agenda. However, the existence of pockets of the insurgents, particularly around the rural communities in the region remains a clog in their wheel of progress (Aminu et al., 2018). The insurgents continue to stage arbitrary attacks on the roads and some communities, limiting the inputs and markets supply chain. Again, the presence of the insurgency around the rural communities has become an impediment for the people to reach out to their far distance farms which are more productive and constrained to cultivate only the marginal farmlands. Because these people depend mostly on farming and related activities, low productivity in the sector would infringe on their socio-economic well-being.

The *Boko-Haram* terrorism, mostly in North East seems to have been the subject of numerous studies, opening up a discussion on how it has affected rural communities and the factors that determine rural livelihoods. Therefore, the essence of this review was to provide details of how the insurgency has affected rural livelihood in the region, and make recommendations on how rural areas someone can sustainably develop. The review looked at how the conflict affected some critical economic sectors such as education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, etc. This is to bring to the fore some fundamental issues that will guide the policy in achieving recovery plans as well as attaining sustainable development in the area. The study sought literature from published journals, periodicals, and other documents from the national government and international donor agencies.

## **2. History and Evolution of *Boko-Haram* Insurgency**

The *Boko Haram* sect was formed in Maiduguri around the year 2002, and the real name of the sect was *Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*. However, due to its anti-western posturing against western education, it was popularly referred to as *Boko-*

*Haram* (Gilbert, 2014). The hitherto non-violent Islamic sect turned armed movement in 2009 (Geraud and Marc-Antoine, 2018) after an armed insurrection was crushed in 2009, particularly with the extrajudicial killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf. This expanded the scope of the activities of the group to other states within and outside the northeast region, leading to the destruction of the lives of security personnel and other civilian members of the society (Avis, 2020). Besides this, the group increased the tempo of their activities by subjugating towns and villages after the destruction of social amenities like hospitals, schools, and markets, to mention a few. As a result of this, their version of the sharia law brutally governed territories captured by the group. The areas captured were in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The continuous violence compelled the government to declare a state of emergency in Borno State and later extended to Yobe and Adamawa states, which lasted until 2014 (ACAPS, 2014; Brechenmacher, 2019). Different schools of thought at various times adduced reasons that drive the formation of the movement and its activities (World Bank 2015).

### **3. The Drivers of the *Boko-Haram* Insurgency**

According to the source and the researcher, there are still conflicting theories about the conditions that caused the *Boko-Haram* insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria. However, there is mounting proof that socioeconomic derivations, extreme religious ideologies, and political variables accounted for a substantial part of the reasons (Adelaja et al., 2018). McGuire (1992) asserts that religion has one of the strongest, most profound effects on family, communal, socioeconomic, and politics; religious ideals guide people's decisions, and religious values aid in interpreting everyday experiences. Islamic fanaticism has contributed to *Boko-Haram's* emergence, and the group's radical religious doctrine, which they use to defend violent activities (Asch, 2018). Specifically, the group is premised to be promoting Sharia law and creating an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. For both individuals and groups, religion continues to be a significant source of social identity and moral authority. As a result, it has declared war on any organisation or notion that it considers being hostile to Islam. But many religious leaders, both inside and outside of the Northeast contest this assertion (Adesoji, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; Thomson, 2012). Onuoha (2014) asserts that the main element driving the acceptance of radical religious ideas, particularly among youth, is ignorance of religious teaching.

Furthermore, politics could be at the centre of the *Boko-Haram* insurgency in Northeast Nigeria (Iyekekpolo, 2016; Mbah et al., 2017). Poor governance that has affected civil liberties, promoted corruption, and weakened government institutions leading to political instability can foment the incidence of terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg, 2001). Many studies attribute the *Boko-Haram* insurrection to the nation's political class (Mbah et al., 2017). Apart from corrupt practices as well as the upper class's haughty displays of

riches, Mohammed & Ahmed (2015) claimed that the main reason for the insurgency was indeed a lack of political will. According to Botha et al. (2017), politicians have created the *Boko-Haram* insurgency. The *Boko-Haram* violence, according to Mustapha (2021), is a manifestation of Nigeria's failed democratic governance, which has led to a high rate of unemployment. Walker (2012) argued that the huge threat caused by poverty in the Northeast region can only be removed by widespread reforms that improve the livelihood of the Northerners.

Equally, Kwaja (2011) opined that disenfranchisement and inequality were key contributing factors to the *Boko-Haram* insurgency. According to Adenrele (2012) and Akinola (2015), poverty and political alienation have substantially contributed to the emergence and continued existence of Boko Haram. This has resulted in poor social and economic outcomes in terms of all development indices such as poverty, healthcare, nutrition, employment, and the paucity of social services and infrastructure (Ngbea, 2014; Marks, 2016; Adeyeye et al., 2021). Additionally, the region's high rates of chronic poverty have been assisted by the absence of substantial infrastructure, economic integration, and effective policies to support agriculture and industrial development. Poverty has thus made it easier for insurgents to attract new members and reduced the right of the government or its institutions to control the threat (O'Connor et al., 2021; Okunlola & Okafor, 2022). The notion that insurgency thrives in poverty and underdevelopment, which makes the poor vulnerable and susceptible to terrorist ideas and recruiting, was also confirmed, according to Dada (2018).

#### **4. Impact of the *Boko-Haram* Insurgency on Rural Communities and Its Implication on Sustainable Development**

##### **4.1. Rural Livelihoods**

The strategies and activities that produce the capabilities for a household's sustenance and long-term well-being make up rural livelihoods (Onwuaroh et al., 2017). Ikpe (2017) asserts that Boko Haram's actions have significantly disrupted the area's key economic activity. The conflict's detrimental effects on the rural economy and way of life severely weakened the region's demographic well-being. In the northeast, there were as there are less meaningful jobs even before the crisis, and there are even fewer now. Agriculture accounted for the majority of labourforce participation (43%) as well as the non-agricultural, primarily unorganised sector (39 percent). Based on the submission of the World Bank (2015), the rate of labour involved in agriculture substantially declined (to about 27%) at the peak of the insurgency (2012-2013). This showed that the insurgency has considerably reduced agricultural activity and restricted access to land for raising crops and livestock. Since agricultural production has decreased, food prices have increased and households are now more susceptible to shocks and stressors. This has caused a significant increase in unemployment, food

insecurity, and poverty in the area. In real terms, the crisis caused the poverty rate to increase from 47.3% in 2011 to roughly 71% in 2019. (Eme & Ibietan, 2012; NBS, 2019; Avis, 2020).

Due to the level of damages done to infrastructure like markets, health and education facilities, and houses to mention a few, there has been a large-scale humanitarian crisis in the area. Due to the number of checkpoints put in place by the security agents and the government's militarized counter-terrorism strategy, quite a number of rural farmers were forced to relocate, and others are prohibited from traveling to their farms (Dabugat, 2013). As a result of rising food insecurity and mounting demands on already stretched and damaged basic social services, this has widened socioeconomic status gaps historically evident in the northeast (Margarita, 2013; Council on Foreign Relations, 2018; World Bank, 2015). The conflict has also eroded social cohesion with social interaction becoming increasingly challenging in an atmosphere of violence that has followed, due to communal, property, and land disputes, and retaliation for conflict-related violence (Brechenmacher, 2019, World Bank, 2015). To be placed succinctly, the conflict has depleted all the rural livelihood assets of the people, placing them in a precarious situation requiring sustained livelihood support.

#### **4.2. Food Security and Nutrition**

Improving food security and eradicating hunger through the promotion of sustainable agriculture are key priorities of the sustainable development goals of the United Nations (Banik, 2019). The *Boko-Haram* conflict has significantly diminished household capacity to carry on with ordinary livelihoods, as well as market function and trade flows, despite the northeast being a region that produces food and serves as a supply route for livestock marketing within and outside the country (Sunday et al., 2017). According to Mwangi et al (2014), the conflict has affected the food supply and nutrition of people across various parts of the region, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. The conflict has caused a reduction in crop output, increased prices of inputs food, and also increased transportation costs. This is partly attributed to the killing of a substantial (about 13,000) number of rural farmers by the insurgents (Mustapha, 2015; Council on Foreign Relations 2015). Equally, a large number (over a million) of fishermen from the area had migrated to other neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroun, and Niger republic. This had a negative impact on fishery activity in the area and the livelihood of the people. Similarly, livestock activities also suffered similar consequences, as it hampered the livestock markets in terms of access to locations, frequency of operations, and attendance of participants (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics & UNICEF, 2014). Because of the insurgency, nearly 15 million people in the area were food insecure. A detailed breakdown of the food insecure population showed that 5.2 million experienced acute food shortages and 54,000 were threatened famine (United States Agency for International Development, 2015). Some areas of the communities affected by the violence have continued to face these

difficulties. For instance, Okechukwu (2014) showed that the operations of *Boko-Haram* terrorists in the region have seriously jeopardized the Federal Government's efforts to increase agricultural output in the Chad Basin. It was determined that numerous hectares of Borno's productive land that had been prepared for the growing of crops had already been deserted as a result of the rebels' actions. It was learned that almost all of the farmers engaged in rice farming and certain other agricultural pursuits were left the huge area of the Chad Basin due to the rebels' actions. Food shortages and a spike in prices are the results of the Chad Basin's agricultural activities being suspended (Adebayo, 2014). Correspondingly also, the Chicken Association of Nigeria (PAN) has expressed alarm about the *Boko-Haram* militants' actions, claiming that restricting access to trade and supplies, is having a negative impact on sales of poultry goods in Northern Nigeria. Oduntan (2014) claimed that the terrorists' actions had caused a continuous decline in sales since some feed ingredients, such as maize and groundnuts, which were typically acquired from the affected states, were unavailable. Additionally, exporting to nearby nations like Chad, Cameroon, and Niger had already become problematic.

Tari *et al.* (2016) investigated the impact of sect activities on a few chosen households' food status in Northern Adamawa State. The study found that the insurgency has a big impact on how to secure food for households. Additionally, it was noted that the number of homes with food insurance remains worrying and that malnutrition, rates among children, remain widespread in the studied areas. In a similar vein, Mercy Corps (2017) observed that terrorism and counter-terrorism tactics have persisted to cause peasants to worry about their wellbeing, which has limited their ability to engage in farming. Besides physical safety, further difficulties included poor road conditions, restrictions, inspections, and rising transportation costs. Even in areas where farmers are still able to grow crops, it is difficult for them to convey their products to urban areas where it is needed because militants have destroyed transportation infrastructure, and vehicles driving on isolated routes run the risk of being ambushed. The volume of agricultural products produced in Nigeria as well as that exported to other nations has decreased as a result of the prohibition on motorbikes, which is the dominant mode of transportation for all of these people in rural areas. Farmers rarely venture outside of places where they feel completely safe to farm as a result of these circumstances, which has led to overcrowding in secure areas and the fragmentation of the land. Additionally, the usage of modified seeds is highly restricted in the region due to the high cost of inputs.

Similar research was conducted by Ojo *et al.* (2018) on the impact of the insurgency on food crops in Nigeria's Borno and the Gombe States. According to the study's findings, farmers were utilizing less farm equipment than was necessary, such as fewer pesticides, fertilizer, seeds, and farmland. It was found that the insurgency had a considerable and detrimental effect on the productivity of farmers farming food crops in the study area. In 2019, Eneji *et al.* examined the impact of insecurity on Gombe

State's agricultural productivity. Many farmers have been forced to abandon their farms by the insurgency in search of safety and security, which has had a negative influence on agricultural productivity, hindered the sector's growth and development, and reduced its ability to contribute to national security. In addition, Augustine et al. (2019) looked at how the *Boko-Haram* resurgence affected cattle output in the Adamawa State, Nigeria, Mubi region. According to the study, strikes by Boko Haram have significantly decreased cattle populations. In a similar vein, Adewuyi & Michael (2020) evaluated how the insurgency affected the production of different crops in the Borno State, Nigeria, Chibok Local Government Area. According to the study, rising insurgent activity had a significant negative impact on the area's rural farmers' ability to produce. In addition, Yakubu et al. (2021) evaluated the impact of the *Boko-Haram* Insurgency on crop output in the Nigerian state of Borno's Hawul Local Government Area. According to the study, there was a large rise in farm operation costs following the conflict, which caused a drop in farm productivity. The well-being and way of life of farmers in the affected areas can be negatively impacted by this decrease in crop yield. Beyond just affecting agricultural output, the insurgency also has a negative impact on farmers' income and nutritional status. According to research by Onwuaroh et al. (2017) on the effect of the insurgency on farmers' income in northern Nigeria, insurgent operations hurt farmers' revenue. Musab & Otovwe (2021) looked at how the *Boko-Haram* insurgency affected several rural residents' nutritional status in the Gulani Local Government Area of Yobe State, Nigeria. The conclusion implied that the insurgency had an impact on the accessibility, quantity, and cost of basic consumables. This suggests that the *Boko-Haram* insurgency will continue to present a significant threat to farming operations and the nutritional status of farmers.

#### **4.3. Healthcare**

Enhanced healthcare service provision is critical to the improvement in the quality of life of citizens and achieving sustainable development (Oyibocho et al., 2014). Because a secure environment is necessary for maintaining quality health services, the relationship between security and healthcare is complicated (Boerma et al., 2019). Even before the emergence of the *Boko-Haram* conflict, populations in northern Nigeria lacked appropriate access to high-quality healthcare. However, the conflict that has existed in the area for more than ten years due to the *Boko-Haram* insurgency has made matters worse. The fighting has caused workers to be displaced as well as the destruction of the few health centres in the majority of the impacted communities. Even after Nigeria celebrated the eradication of polio, insurgents who were holding towns and villages prevented the region from receiving an equitable distribution of the polio vaccine, leading to the resurgence of new cases (Tyndall et al., 2020). Similar restrictions, such as a lack of knowledge about services and high transportation expenses, prevent the majority of IDPs in host societies from accessing health services. In terms of the spread of communicable diseases like cholera and polio



in the area, this has had very severe health consequences.

The health and well-being of the populace as well as the efficient operation of the nation's healthcare system are both threatened by various health effects brought on by the insurgency (Boerma *et al.*, 2019). Olarewaju (2021) claims that the *Boko-Haram* humanitarian crisis has resulted in high fatalities (over 37,500) and large-scale displacements (of over 2 million people), with serious consequences in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, and Gombe states. The negative impact of conflict on maternal and child health is extensive and includes things like lack of shelter, unsafe and sanitary conditions, food shortages, a shortage of medical professionals, and restricted access to high-quality treatment. Nigeria, which is currently the eighth-most populous nation in the world, is responsible for 20% of all maternal fatalities worldwide, with an alarming maternal mortality ratio of 800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. Given the scarcity of operational healthcare facilities in the region, this consequence might be the worst in the Northeast. Dunn (2018) also looked at the connection between violent conflict and malnutrition among children in Northeast Nigeria. The findings imply that poor child health outcomes in Northeast Nigeria's conflict zones may be related to social service disruptions and increased food insecurity in a region already lacking in resources. The findings highlight the significance of suitable programs and policies to care for children in war zones, even when other undiscovered causes may also lead to violence-associated waste.

Sato (2019) also assessed the *Boko-Haram* conflict in north-eastern Nigeria for its causal impact on vaccination rates. Conflict situations have a significant negative impact on the likelihood of vaccination; if an armed struggle breaks out within 10 Kilometres of a child's home, the probability that such a child will receive any immunization is 47.2 percent lower. BCG, as well as DPT1, have odds ratios of 0.55 and 0.52, respectively. Additionally, the study also indicated that less educated people are more affected by armed conflict than educated people are. In a similar line, Ekhatior-Mobayode *et al.* (2022) investigated whether an increase in Intimate partner violence (IPV) is related to the *Boko-Haram* insurgency. The study found that, after adjusting for known correlates of IPV such as partner's alcohol use, prior exposure to IPV, and IPV being accepted as a social norm, the existence of *Boko-Haram* increases the likelihood that women may face sexual and physical IPV by roughly 4 percent points.

#### **4.4. Education**

According to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, all students should possess the knowledge and skills necessary to advance sustainable development (O'Flaherty & Liddy, 2018). To understand the discourse on the impact of education in the Northeast region we need to flash back on some critical facts in the sector. According to the country's educational perspective, almost 10.5 million children are out of school. Additionally, 62 percent of those who are not in school reside in Northern Nigeria, where almost half of the men and 61 percent of the women have never attended school. The *Boko-Haram* conflict has badly harmed the otherwise appalling

status of education in the North-eastern states. Conflict and instability have a direct and compounding detrimental effect on children's access to school, the availability of learning environments and resources, and the competence of instructors, according to the HNO (2014). From 2009 through 2015, well over 910 schools were destroyed by the insurgent organization, while 1,500 others were closed down. Once more, by 2016, 19,000 teachers had been driven from their homes and almost 600 had died. 600,000 of the nearly one million youngsters who have been uprooted have no access to any form of schooling. A third of elementary school students and a fourth of secondary school students in junior levels did not attend class (OCHA, 2014).

Given the 2014 kidnapping of more than 200 female students from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, the situation became frightening for young girls (Hassan, 2014). Parents were demotivated from sending their kids to school as a result, and those who were already enrolled were pulled out. All of these incidents occurred in a region that was already educationally impoverished before the insurgency, and additional attacks will weaken the area and the educational sector generally in the near future by increasing the proportion of young people who have dropped out of school, are uneducated, are unemployed, and at risk of being attracted to terrorists' activities (Segun et al., 2016; Awortu, 2015). The *Boko-Haram* insurgency has impacted the quality of manpower planning and the overall performance of tertiary institutions, as a result of the decreased level of productivity of staff. This was also caused by the exit of some competent staff to other safer regions, according to a recent study in the area by Ojeleke et al. (2022).

#### **4.5. Critical Infrastructure**

Infrastructure is necessary to stimulate economic growth and poverty eradication (Fay et al., 2011). The type and size of infrastructure, however, are decisions that have an impact on the well-being of the people and achieving sustainable development (Yusuf, 2012). The social and economic well-being of Nigeria's population is undoubtedly impacted by the scarcity and deterioration of infrastructure throughout the country (Amalu, 2015). A low level of life is indicated by the condition of the three categories of vital infrastructures, namely utility, physical, and social (Kanayo et al., 2013). Since it began in 2009, the *Boko-Haram* conflict has impacted numerous types of infrastructure. Due to the war in the area, homes, roads, bridges, classrooms, medical facilities, and public structures have all suffered different levels of damage (Mbah et al., 2017). Networks for electricity, energy, and telecommunication have been severely damaged. For instance, IEDs, suicide attacks, and other explosive devices damaged about 530 telecom base stations in 2012 (Onuoha, 2014). Additionally, the infrastructure for water and sanitation in the areas affected by the violence was devastated to the tune of 75% (UNDP, 2020; World Bank, 2015).

Road movements have remained dangerous and challenging due to the destruction of public infrastructure. As shown in Figure 2, the mobility of products and people has

therefore been constrained. Poor road conditions have come to light as a significant problem that hinders a farmer's capacity to transport goods to markets and further erodes the distribution system for agricultural supplies. This means that farmers will be unable to learn about new technology and methods for a while, in addition to having difficulty obtaining seeds as well as other resources (Merrick and Li, 2014; Mercy Corps, 2017). Agriculture output has been decimated because of the insecurity, and prices have increased elsewhere in the nation (Kathleen, 2014).

In an effort to rebuild the war-ravaged Northeast, the World Bank (2015) assessed the region's level of damages incurred. It was reported that the conflict had caused about US\$9 billion in economic damages. It was further revealed that Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states incurred damages to the tune of \$5.9 billion, US\$1.6, and US\$1.2 billion respectively. Agriculture and homes (over 400,000 lost about \$3.5 billion in damages. Ikpe (2017) contends that the conflict has changed governments' priorities in expending public funds on capital projects.

#### **4.6. Commerce and Trade**

Trade between Northeast Nigeria and indeed the rest of Nigeria was greater before the insurgency, but the wanton destruction of the infrastructure impacted the private sector by impairing the operations of small and medium-sized businesses and markets (World Bank, 2015). Markets have frequently been impacted, and security personnel has also shuttered markets for safety (Brenchenmaches, 2019; Idika-Kalu, 2020). The government's determination to keep its borders largely closed with neighbouring nations including Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger Republic severely impacted trade, according to Merrick and Li (2014). Whereas these connections still exist, there has been currently very little to no trade because borders are still blocked. Reduced connectivity has had a severe negative impact on the economy as villagers are being abandoned and others are isolated. Because of the limited mobility of people, commodities, and services due to damaged infrastructure, ongoing violence, and restricted movement along the borders, trade has been seriously affected. As important commercial routes became blocked, the trading volume drastically decreased (World Bank, 2015).

Ikpe (2017) asserts that instability has a detrimental impact on trade through disruption of trade flows, a rise in the costs of the transaction, risks to formal sector financial activities, and a decline in investment as a result of uncertainty. Losing institutions and transport channels have impacted trade, particularly in agriculture. It has drawn attention to higher transaction costs associated with Boko-Haram's demands for forced payments and tribute from farmers, as well as higher transport costs and lower trade volumes. This directly contributed to increased food prices in the area and elsewhere. One of Nigeria's biggest potential sources of income has been lost because of the collapse of the agricultural export industry in the northern states. Additionally, this has led to a decline in agricultural consumption. The robust fisheries sector in

the area had also collapsed, and wildlife has also suffered. Due to this, the important agricultural commodity markets for export in the northern states have been severely damaged, cutting off one of Nigeria's biggest potential sources of income (Merrick and Li, 2014). Additionally, some impacted communities' operating hours have been restricted because of an enforced curfew. Restoring these commercial connections will improve the region's chances for income generation and sustainable livelihoods (Mercy Corps, 2017; Mohammed & Ahmed, 2015; Hoinathy & Tayo, 2022). According to Onwusiribe et al. (2015), this is due to the conflict's spill over effects on many other parts of the nation. Their study evaluated how the insurgency affected the productivity of food vendors in Nigeria's Abia State. The study's conclusions demonstrated that the violence has decreased the amount of commerce, profitability, as well as the number of players in the market.

#### **4.7. Socio-Cultural Setting and Tourism**

The northeast has a rich culture due to the diversity of the people, and the environment has some landforms and wild animal that has generated some reasonable revenue over the years. However, along with markets and cultural landmarks, religious buildings including churches and mosques also sustained considerable damage. Insurgents from the *Boko-Haram* sects had also seized control of Sambisa Forest and had been causing environmental damage, endangering wildlife, and frightening tourists (Buhari & Stephen, 2018). Sukur town, which was designated by UNESCO as a global historic monument in 1999, is located in Madagali LGA in Adamawa State and was extensively devastated by the *Boko-Haram* insurgency. The *Boko-Haram* conflict has severely damaged the local tourism economy, according to the Federation of Tourism Association for Nigeria. The story for Sukur is altered by the *Boko-Haram* attacks that occurred between 2014 and 2017 in Madagali as well as other local government areas of Adamawa, which are considered to be the crown jewels of Nigeria's tourism industry.

#### **5. Conclusion**

The *Boko-Haram* conflict has negatively impacted the livelihood and subsequent growth and sustainable development in the Northeast, notably in the three affected states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Even though some impacted rural areas have made significant progress toward returning to normalcy, the harm done cannot be undone quickly. Agricultural production and trade, the impacted people's main sources of income, are the two important ways to empower them. This is due to the fact that, despite the agricultural sector's poor performance, which falls short of economic expectations, the sector can help the socio-economic development of those who live in rural areas. This can be achieved by affording the affected people access to improved farm inputs like higher quality seeds and fertilizer among others. There is also the need to boost security in farming communities to facilitate access to farmlands and markets for trading. This is in addition to the gradual provision of basic

amenities like hospitals, schools, electricity, and water among others. Equally, the government at all tiers must also give religious beliefs and ideologies more importance to stop a repeat of this tragic incident. Therefore, effective value reorientation programs should be included in the support being given to the affected communities.

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