



EFFECT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA (A STUDY OF KAGA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, BORNO STATE)

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Abstract: *This paper examined the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria with reference to Kaga Local Government Area, Born State, Nigeria. The objectives were to assess the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on health care services in Kaga Local Government Area; determine the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in Borno State and examine the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on environmental security in Borno State. The population of this study consisted of 90,015 people in Kaga Local Government. The justification for adoption of the population was to enable the researcher to carry out this study based on the number of people in the Area and the sample size was 398 selected for the study. The sampling technique adopted for the purpose of this study was simple random sampling technique. The justification for the adoption of this technique was that to enable every member of the subset to have an equal chance of being selected for the study. The research employed primary source through the administration of questionnaire. The justification for the adoption of primary data was to obtain first-hand information that would aid in obtaining a reliable result. Simple percentage was adopted to present the data collected from the field. The findings showed that there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on health care services, there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on Food security ad there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on environmental security in Kaga Local Government Area.*

Keywords: *Effect, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Human Security, Food Security*

Introduction

Security as an essential concept is commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values especially the survival of individual, groups or objects in the near future. Thus, security as the name implies, involves the ability to pursue cherished political and social ambitions (Williams 2008). According to Palme (1992), "there is a correlation between security and survival", whereas survival is an essential condition, security is viewed as safety, confidence, free from danger, fear, doubt, among others. Therefore, security is survival-plus and the word 'plus' could be understood from the standpoint of being able to enjoy some freedom from life-determining threats and some choices. However, the concept security is meaningless without a critical discourse of something pertinent to secure. In the long sweep of human history, the central focus

of security has been people; contrarily, some scholars especially those in international politics have argued that when thinking about security, states should be the most important referent. On the other hand, some analysts have challenged this position by arguing that any intellectual discuss on security should accord priority to human beings since without reference to individuals, human security makes no sense.

Borno State, like many other states in Northern Nigeria, has seen many attacks by the notorious Boko Haram Islamic insurgent sect that operates in that part of the country. Borno State has been revealed as the terrorist group's base of operations in recent discussions (Abinbola, 2012). The group's activities are rife with issues of insecurity, owing to the group's links to the economy, social, political, and governance, all of which have spiralling effects on the people of Borno State (Adams et al, 2014).

The activities of Boko Haram have fundamentally affected the socioeconomic lives of individuals in the North East. For example, commercial banks have been forced to review their operational hours to begin from 9.00am to 12.00 noon as against the normal operational period of 8.00am to 4.00pm (Mohammed, 2012). This development has led bank customers particularly traders, are finding it difficult to deposit their daily earnings in the banks due to the limited hours of banks operational that no longer last. As a result this, the bank's total earning will be affected and even countries involved in trading at the Northern part of the country was affected as well. Under this circumstance, the socioeconomic activities in the north was affected not just Nigerian but even Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon among others.

Statement of the Problem

The high rate of destruction by Boko Haram has disturbing effect on Nigeria's national security to the extent that the federal Government declared a state of emergency in the affected states and this situation further exacerbated the livelihood challenges of the people in the area of education, unemployment, poverty, food production and distribution, destruction of infrastructure, human casualties, displacement of people, closed down businesses or put to temporary halt, among others, all these undermined the socioeconomic development of the affected areas in the north east. The insurgents have been responsible for the attacks in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe states and other states, but attacks on churches and mosques are particularly disturbing because they are intended to inflame religious tensions and upset the nation's social cohesion (Eme, *et. al*, 2012). Since 2009 over 20,000 people have been killed in Boko Haram related violence and about 1.7m people from the three affected states have been forced to flee their homes and are living in internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps (OCHA, 2017). These people and large refugees in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republic are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Several interventions and programmes by government, NGOs and Humanitarian organisations like the Red Cross, Red Crescent, Rescue Victims Support Fund (VSF), Danish Rescue Council the civilian joint tax force etc, committed to catering for the affected and displaced people are ongoing, with IDP camps in some non-affected areas and other states like Taraba, Gombe, Bauchi, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to accommodate them. Also, the Nigerian Army counter insurgency response and the Multi National Joint Tax Force (MJTF) have responded with counter attack and much success has been achieved through the use of military power, this made government response to the security threat to be tilted more to state security leading to a shift from human security. It is in this regard that Imaralu (2014) submits that insurgency is a force redirecting government security focus from Human security that is synonymous to development to defence through increase in defence budget, deepen the woes of the people.

Several studies have been carried on the effect of Boko Haram insurgency such as Ngozi (2020), this study is carried out to examine the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in

Nigeria with reference to Kaga Local Government Area of Borno State, thereby bridging the existing gap.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to examine the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria while the specific objectives are to

- i. assess the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on health care services in Kaga Local Government Area
- ii. determine the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in Borno State.
- iii. examine the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on environmental security in Borno State

LITERATURE REVIEW

Concept of Boko Haram

'Boko' according to Liman (1968) is a native Hausa word, originally meaning sham, fraud, inauthenticity, and such which came to represent western education and learning. Hence, 'Boko' came to symbolize Western education or Westernization while 'Haram', according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is an Arabic word which means 'forbidden', 'ungodly' or 'sinful'. Put together, the term Boko Haram literally translates thus, 'Westernization is sinful', 'Western education is forbidden' or 'Western influence is a sin'. Barna (2014) notes that Boko Haram is the name commonly associated with the organization '*Jama'atu Ahlis-sunnah Lidda'Awati Wa'l-Jihad*', or 'the people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and Jihad'.

As observed by Soyinka (2014) BH has a very long history; whether described as an army of the discontent or as marginalized or feeling marginalized, the movement relies on religion as a fuel for their operation, mobilization, and augmentation of any other legitimate or illegitimate grievance that they might have against society. Although Boko Haram is often viewed to have emerged in 2002, Onuoha (2014), traces the origin of the sect to the *Ahlulsunna wal' jama'ah hijra* (a Muslim Youth Organization) founded in 1995 by Abubakar Lawan – who eventually departed for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia – in Maiduguri; heralding the emergence of an unorganized movement made up of pockets of religiously-inclined individuals at the Mohammed Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri.

Onuoha (2014), notes that the Muslim Youth Organization founded by Abubakar Lawan excelled as a non-violent movement until the appointment of Mohammad Yusuf as its leader in 2002 drawing members from the unemployed and disadvantaged youth population in Yobe and Borno States along with others from neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger at which point the group's name was the *Yusufiyya* movement. Mohammed (2014), recounts the exodus of a group self-identified as the 'Nigerian Taliban' from Maiduguri in 2003 to a rural area called *Kanama* in the Yunusari local government area of Yobe State contiguous with the Nigerian border from where the group launched attacks on police stations and government buildings between December 2003 and January 2004 although these and related activities were eventually contained by the Nigerian Military. More so, Mohammed (2014) reports the reunification of surviving 'Nigerian Taliban' members from the Kanama offensive with Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri and its environs – then operating under the cover of the Yusufiyya movement.

According to Onuoha (2014), after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, BH regrouped, mobilized, recruited, radicalized its members and advanced in sophistication of attacks, deploying tactics including hit-and-run assaults, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS), suicide bombings, attacks on security formations and civilian targets, kidnappings (such as the infamous 276 Chibok girls kidnap), gruesome executions etc. Peters (2017) noted the introduction of the Ansaru faction of BH which broke away over discontent with the brutal style of Abubakar Shekau and operating mainly between 2012 and 2013. According to Peters (2017), Ansaru debuted under the leadership of Khalid al-Barnawi and also included the hitherto third in command to Shekau, Mamman Nur. However, in spite of portraying a strategy influenced by al-Qaeda and courting the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the faction became moribund towards the end of 2013.

According to Jacob and Akpan (2015), Mohammed Yusuf set up Islamic schools (*madrassah*) and organizations that offered many a disadvantaged Muslim youths a sense of belonging – although, affluent and gainfully employed members of society reportedly identify as members of the sect. Hence, it is pertinent to note that while the devastating impact of poverty may influence mobilization of the teeming youths, poverty is not a lone factor of motivation for allegiance to terrorist organizations. According to ICC (2015), Boko Haram's strategy of offering financial assistance to low income, artisans and needy individuals earned the sect a considerable level of support in the Northeast and encouraged the youth's involvement in terrorist activities. The sect reportedly induced families with cash to release their wards – minors – who are deployed as soft tools for intelligence on the activities of military personnel; making an effective strategy as children are assumed benign; thus, pose no security risk.

Insurgency

O'Neil (1990) in Amalu, N. S. (2015) defined insurgency as a struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics. According to Curtas (2006), the main objective of insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control and requires the active support of some segment of the population as insurgencies do not happen if the population either supports the government or sees nothing to gain from fighting.

Human Security

The 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined human security as people's safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Consequently, seven types of security were listed as components of human security: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal (physical) security; community security; and political security.

Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on Health Care Services

Health is the most important thing in the life of every living organism for without health, nothing else really matters. It forms the basis for all other activities and achievements. It is defined as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity [WHO, 2006]. This implies that the physical environment plays a vital role in the fullness of one's health.

When there is a negative effect on the sustainability of the environment quality necessary for the wellbeing, environmental health problems emerge. Environmental health problems occur as a result of poor environmental quality. It is estimated that at least 12.6 million deaths each year are as result of unhealthy environments. This accounts for 23% of all deaths and 26% of deaths of children under the age of 5 globally; primarily due to preventable environmental factors.

Healthcare is the act of taking necessary or preventive medical procedure to improve a person's wellbeing. This may be done with surgery, administration of medicine or other alterations in a person's lifestyle. Such services are typically offered through a healthcare system made up of hospitals and physicians (Business Dictionary, 2017).

Over 788 health facilities have been lost to insurgent activities in the north-east, Borno State, particularly in Kaga Local Government Area. Since 2014, Boko haram intensifies their brutal attacks against health workers. They have killed over 25 health works, primarily polio vaccinators in the beginning of 2014 according to a report by Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) (Caulderwood, 2014). Such attacks led to a warning by GPEI that it will put enormous strain on efforts to halt transmission rate (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

According to Internal Displacement Monitoring Committee Council (IDMC) at least 37% of primary healthcare facilities in emergency areas including Maiduguri have been shut down as a result of the menaces of Boko Haram insurgents and more than 50% of such are yet to be opened. Doctors, nurses and pharmacists flee for their lives from the brutal attacks by the insurgents. The sick persons are forced to trek to vast distances, before receiving medical attention. Vaccination programs for children are compromised (Ojora-Saraki, 2016).

Effect if Boko Haram Insurgency on Food Security

Food security refers to the availability of food and one 's access to it. A household is considered food secure when its occupants do not live in hunger or fear of starvation (FAO, 2001). Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (Idachaba, 2006). In the World Bank Policy Study (2006) food security is defined as access by all people at all times to enough food for an active healthy life. To the Economic Commission for Africa (2009) food security involves not only food availability through storage, and trade but also more importantly food access through domestic or home production. It is of contentions that for a country to have sustainable food security, food supplies must keep pace with increase population, urbanization and insecurity (FAO, 2010).

The activities of insurgencies in Borno has negatively aggravated all agriculture stakeholders; crop farmers, fish farmers and herders, through harvest confiscations, market raiding, cattle rustling, fish catch impounding, farm taxes, barn burning, abduction of farmers, abduction and rape of women who are central to the farming communities. These heinous activities against the farming communities trigger food insecurity has it constricted the very physical, social and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs, produce and stay healthy. In fact, food security is when there is food sufficiency with no hunger or fear of starvation. Several indicators are associated with food security. These include availability, access, adequate utilization and stability of food supply at all times.

Sambe et al. (2013) examined the impact of communal violence on food security in Africa. The study established that communal violence affects food security through limiting people's access to food, destruction of infrastructure for food production, cutting access to food supplies, physical destruction and plundering of crops, livestock and food reserves. Other impacts include displacement of labour. The study concluded that communal violence directly and indirectly leads

to food insecurity in Africa countries. The study is a cross-country study and results emanated from it cannot be used for State specific study like Borno State in Nigeria, because the operational environment differs in terms of regulation, supervision and operation.

Tari *et al.* (2016) deployed purposive and simple random sampling techniques to analyse the impact of the Boko Haram sect activities on food security status of households in selected localities in Northern Adamawa state. The study used Logit Regression Model on 200 target populations with simple random technique was used to determine the sample size for this study. Findings from the study revealed that there exists a strong relationship between insurgency and food security status in the study areas. Study focused on nexus between insecurity and food security while this study went further to use education security as constructs for human security in Borno State to assess the security implications of terrorism on Borno State

Ladan and Matawalli (2020) engaged focus group discussion to examine the nexus between food security and banditry in affected local government areas of Katsina State. The study adopted qualitative study approach. Results from study revealed that banditry has negatively affected food security in has been negatively impacted by banditry which entailed kidnapping and killing of farmers, seizing of farmlands, theft of cattle, chasing of farmers out of their farmlands, blocking of local trade routes, burning and raiding of grain silos. The study done in Katsina captures only effect of banditry on food security of which this study captures into education security to assess implications of terrorism on security in Borno State.

Lengmang (2011, p.51) carried out a study on Terrorism and the challenges of food security in the Lake Chad Region: A study of Boko Haram 2007- 2017. The purpose of the study was to find out the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on crop cultivation, productivity, food accessibility and affordability of food products in Northern Nigeria. Descriptive survey was the design of the study which was guarded by three research questions and three null hypotheses. The result of the study showed through regression analysis the effects of Boko Haram violence on the three variables namely: crop cultivation, food availability, food accessibility and food affordability were found to be negative. Further breakdown of the study analysis showed that 5.2 million of people in the Northern Nigeria are severely food insecure, while over 54,000 face famine. This study is related to the current study by virtue of the fact that both studies were descriptive survey studies that used the same sampling technique to select their study sample and also used the same statistical tool to test their null hypotheses. The former study is also related to the present study because food security is also one of the variables of human security in the present study.

Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on Environmental Security

Ekpo and Ishaq (2018) conducted a study to examine the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the bio-physical environment of north eastern Nigeria. Survey research design was adopted for the study. The study revealed significant effect of Boko Haram insurgency on biological, socio-cultural and physical environments of north eastern Nigeria. Based on the findings of the study, utilization of education to curb insurgency especially prioritization and inclusion of environmental education in the country's school curriculum, as means of sensitizing citizens on national environmental issues and problems were advocated and recommended. Begaji *et al* (2012, p.67) buttressed that an attempt to forcefully impose religious ideology and or belief on Nigeria's secular society is not new. The leader of the Maitatsine sectarian group attempted it in 1981 and eventually led to large scale uprisings. Since the early 1980s and 2012, Nigeria has witnessed other uncountable religious related crises. Beginning from 2009, the country once again, has been stormed by large scale and unimaginable bomb attacks by the Boko Haram movement. They argued that in a bid to arrest the situation, the Nigerian National Assembly on 17th February, 2011 passed a bill on Anti-Terrorism. Even with the Bill in place, and the invitation to negotiate by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, Boko Haram attacks, which initially was confined to North-

Eastern Nigeria, like cancer has infected the North-Central and is spreading to Southern Nigeria. Given the inherent unsettled political and economic environment, the menace caused by Boko Haram attacks has cashed in to compound an already chaotic situation. A fall-out of the Boko Haram saga for example, is the re-awakening of the acrimonies call for a Sovereign National Conference by implication; the so-called one Nigeria" is being questioned.

Theoretical Framework

Criminal Deterrence Theory

Deterrence in relation to criminal offending is the theory that the danger and severity of punishment will deter people from committing crime and decrease the likelihood and level of wrongs in society. It is one of five objectives that punishment is thought to achieve; the other four objectives are retribution, incapacitation (for the protection of society), denunciation, and rehabilitation. This theory as postulated by two 18th century utilitarian philosophers; Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, has two possible applications: the first is that punishments imposed on individual offenders will deter or prevent that particular offender from committing further crimes; the second is that, public knowledge that certain offences will be punished has a generalised deterrent effect which prevents others from committing crimes (Wright, 2010).

In relation to terrorism and counterterrorism, research on deterring terrorism usually accepts and incorporates a broadened understanding of deterrence. A would-be challenger (usually defined as the actor being deterred) and his unwanted action remain the principal focus, but the manner in which a defender (the actor doing the deterring) manipulates a specific behavior is expanded to include arguments that rest well beyond the scope of traditional deterrence theory. Scholars suggest that a range of militant activity— from proselytizing violent ideologies to indoctrinating and recruiting individuals, and from sponsoring militancy to coordinating specific attacks—can be deterred by a variety of tailored threats (Jenkins, 2008; Levi, 2008; Auerwald, 2006).

Accordingly, though a vast majority of terrorist groups lacks traditional territorially based assets against which classical threats of punishment and retaliation might be issued which is a dilemma known as the return address problem (Gearson, 2012; Brown & Arnold, 2010; Betts, 2002), yet terrorist and militants do hold onto and seek to protect other things that States can threaten to harm, restrict, or destroy (territorial footholds and safe houses, weapons caches, smuggling routes, effective and charismatic leaders, or State based facilitators (Wenger & Wilner, 2012), because some militant assets rest beyond the realm punishable by military or kinetic destruction alone, the coercive process involved in deterring terrorism often relies on non-kinetic instruments that target non-physical resources and assets.

Interestingly, on the non-kinetic fronts, States might join, strengthen, compel, or convince local, regional, foreign, and virtual (online) communities; elites and religious or tribal elders; youth and university-based social movements; and NGOs or civil society actors to manipulate (and hopefully augment) social disenfranchisement with, and resentment of, a particular militant movement or group. This is a function of deterrence by delegitimation, in which terrorists' political, ideological, or religious rationales and intentions which rest beyond kinetic destruction are used against them to influence public sentiment, stem recruitment, alter behavior, and deter support for political violence (Lantis, 2009). It is this on this front that more is expected on the war against terrorism by all involving countries with emphasis on the no kinetic, which contradict the very narrative upon which terrorism stands.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Study Area

This study is focus on Kaga Local Government area. It is one of the oldest local government area created in 1976 during the local government reforms of the late general Murtala Mohammed's military government. Kaga local government area is made up of three districts namely Kaga, Galandi and Dandalwa. The headquarters of the local government is Benisheikh. It has an area of 2,700km². Diverse ethnic groups such as Kanuri, Hausa and Fulani makes up the population of the local government. Islam and Christianity are practiced in the area. Irrigation farming is a key component of the economic activities undertaken by dwellers of the Kaga with a wide variety of crops grow in the area. Trade also flourishes in the area with the Local government hosting a number of markets such as the Mainok Friday market. The local government is also a hub for the rearing and sales of a number of domestic animals such as cows, rams and horses

Sources of Data

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data are information gathered from questionnaires respondents through questionnaires while secondary sources of data are already published work gotten from textbooks, magazines, journals, internet, library and past projects in relation to the impact of remuneration and motivation on job performance.

Population of the Study

The study population area concerned comprises of the entire people of Kaga Local Government. The estimated population of the local government is 90,015 according to the 2006 National Population Census.

Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

For the purpose of this study, the sample size adopted was 398 out of the entire population of 90,019. The sample size was taken by using Yaro Yamane formula, shown below:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: n = sample size

N = population of the study

1 = constant

e = level of significant (5%)

$$n = \frac{90,015}{1 + 90,015 (0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{90,015}{1 + 90,015 (0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{90,015}{1 + 225.0375}$$

$$n = \frac{90,015}{225.0375}$$

$$n = 398$$

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Table 1: Responses to destruction of medical facilities by the Boko Haram insurgency has affected health care services in Kaga Local Government Area

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	180	46
Agree	100	26
Disagree	50	13
Strongly disagree	60	15
Total	390	100

Table 1 indicates that 180 respondents representing 46% strongly agreed that the destruction of medical facilities by the Boko Haram insurgency has affected health care services in Kaga Local Government Area, 100 respondents representing 26% agreed and 50 respondents representing 13% disagreed while 60 respondents representing 15% strongly disagreed. This shows that the insurgency destroyed medicinal facilities in the area.

Table 2: Responses to the frequent Boko Haram attacks has made it difficult it difficult in the delivery of essential health services to pregnant women in Kaga LGA

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	200	51
Agree	100	26
Disagree	40	10
Strongly disagree	50	13
Total	390	100

Table 2 indicates that 200 respondents representing 51% strongly agreed that the frequent Boko Haram attacks had made it difficult in the delivery of essential health services to pregnant women in Kaga LGA, 100 respondents representing 26% agreed and 40 respondents representing 10% disagreed while 50 respondents representing 13% strongly disagreed to the statement. This is that the frequent attacks by the insurgents made it difficult in the delivery of essential health services to pregnant women in the Local Government Area.

Table 3: Responses to whether killing of medical doctors and other health workers by the Boko Haram sect has affected both primary and secondary health sectors

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	250	64
Agree	100	26
Disagree	40	10
Strongly disagree	0	0
Total	390	100

Table 3 indicates that 250 respondents representing 64% strongly agreed that killing of medical doctors and other health workers by the sect has affected both primary and secondary health sectors in Kaga local Government Area, 100 respondents representing 26% agreed and 40

respondents representing 10% disagreed. This shows that both primary and secondary health sectors were affected by the insurgency especially with the killing of medical personnel.

Table 4: Responses to whether the violent activities of Boko Haram insurgency and subsequent destruction of foods crops had led to food insecurity

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	250	64
Agree	100	26
Disagree	40	10
Strongly disagree	0	0
Total	390	100

Table 4 indicates that 250 respondents representing 64% strongly agreed that the violence activities of Boko Haram insurgency and its subsequent destruction of food crops has led to food insecurity in the Local Government Area, 100 respondents representing 26% agreed and 40 respondents representing 10% disagreed. This shows that there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency o food security in Kaga Local Government Area.

Table 5: Responses to whether killing of farmers by Boko Haram sect has affected food production

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	200	51
Agree	100	26
Disagree	40	10
Strongly disagree	50	13
Total	390	100

Table 5 shows that 200 respondents representing 51% strongly agreed that killing of farmers by Boko Haram sect has affected food production in the Local Government Area, 100 respondents representing 26% agreed and 40 respondents representing 10% disagreed while 50 respondents representing 13% strongly disagreed. This shows that there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in the Local Government Area.

Table 6: Responses to whether looting of food store houses by the Boko Haram insurgents is greatly responsible for food instability

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	160	41
Agree	130	33
Disagree	30	13
Strongly disagree	50	13
Total	390	100

Table 6 indicates that 160 respondents representing 41% strongly agreed that looting of food store houses by the Boko Haram insurgents is greatly responsible for food instability in Kaga Local Government, 130 respondents representing 33% agreed and 50 respondents representing 13% disagreed while 50 respondents representing 13% strongly disagreed. This shows that looting of food store houses by the insurgents is responsible for food instability in the Local Government.

Table 7: Responses to whether Boko Haram has not affected biodiversity in Kaga Local Government Area

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	150	38
Agree	130	33
Disagree	60	15
Strongly disagree	50	13
Total	390	100

Table 7 indicates that 150 respondents representing 38% strongly agreed that Boko Haram insurgency has affected the biodiversity in the Local Government Area, 130 respondents representing 33% agreed, 60 respondents representing 15% disagreed while 50 respondents representing 13% strongly disagreed. This shows that Boko Haram insurgency has affected the biodiversity in the Local Government Area.

Table 8: Responses on whether the activities of Boko Haram insurgency has altered land use pattern in Kaga Local Government Area

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	150	38
Agree	130	33
Disagree	60	15
Strongly disagree	50	13
Total	390	100

Table 8 indicates that 150 respondents representing 38% strongly agreed that Boko Haram insurgency has altered land use pattern in the Local Government Area, 130 respondents representing 33% agreed, 60 respondents representing 15% disagreed while 50 respondents representing 13% strongly disagreed. This shows that Boko Haram insurgency has altered land use pattern in the Local Government Area.

Table 9: Responses to whether Boko Haram Insurgency increased desertification in Kaga Local Government Area

Responses	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	150	38
Agree	130	33
Disagree	60	15
Strongly disagree	50	13
Total	390	100

Table 4.2.13 indicates that 150 respondents representing 38% strongly agreed that Boko Haram insurgency has increased desertification in the Local Government Area, 130 respondents representing 33% agreed, 60 respondents representing 15% disagreed while 50 respondents representing 13% strongly disagreed. This shows that Boko Haram insurgency has increased desertification in the in the Local Government Area.

Discussion

The finding shows that there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on health care services in Kaga Local Government Area. This finding is in line with Ojora-Sarak (2016) who asserted that according to Internal Displacement Monitoring Committee Council (IDMC) at least 37% of primary healthcare facilities in emergency areas including Maiduguri have been shut down as a result of the menaces of Boko haram insurgents and more than 50% of such are yet to be opened. Doctors, nurses and pharmacists flee for their lives from the brutal attacks by the insurgents. The sick persons are forced to trek to vast distances, before receiving medical attention. Vaccination programs for children are compromised.

The second finding indicates that there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in Kaga Local Government Area. This finding also corroborates with Sambe et al. (2013) who examined the impact of communal violence on food security in Africa and established that communal violence affects food security through limiting people's access to food, destruction of infrastructure for food production, cutting access to food supplies, physical destruction and plundering of crops, livestock and food reserves.

The third finding indicates that the Boko Haram insurgency affects environmental security in Kaga Local Government Area. This finding is also in line with Ekpo and Ishaq (2018) whose finding study revealed significant effect of Boko Haram insurgency on biological, socio-cultural and physical environments of north eastern Nigeria.

Conclusion

Having examined the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria, the research concludes that their effect of Boko Haram insurgency on health care services, there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on Food security and there is effect of Boko Haram insurgency on environmental security in Kaga Local Government Area.

Recommendations

From the findings of the study, the research recommends the following:

1. Create job opportunities for young people: Whether in Nigeria where the Boko Haram group originated or in neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger where it has found a recruitment pool, limited opportunities for legitimate livelihood have made young people more vulnerable and hence more intrigued in joining insurgent groups. Thus, robust and targeted interventions to create jobs in Nigeria, particularly in Borno State, and amongst the border communities of neighbouring states, should form a key priority of the recruiting base. Achieving this will require clamping down on corruption to free up enough resources for the interventions that are desperately needed in this area.
2. Protecting and strengthening human security: The Nigerian military has too often taken civilian casualties too easy into account. By killing citizens in the North, the population's frustration against the military increases, thereby increasing Boko Haram's appeal as an alternative. The government should rather put its focus on the protection of civilians, witnesses and key peacemakers such as moderate Imams who preach against the insurgency. Therefore, the Nigerian military and militaries of neighbouring countries should shift their focus from retaliation attacks to improved defensive and intelligence measures. In addition, Nigeria needs to step up its governance capacity by improving traditional state services such as health, transport and social protection for its citizens. By increasing the legitimacy of the government, Boko Haram will lose its constituency in the long run.

3. Rollout counter-violent extremism programmes: Nigeria, in partnership with her neighbours and the international community should evolve and support region-wide counter-violent extremism advocacy. Such an ideological operation should be robustly framed in Arabic, Hausa, and Kanuri languages, and in the respect of cultures and traditions, to debunk Boko Haram ideology, narratives and messages, thereby making it difficult for the group to recruit from citizens in the region.
4. Improving the human rights record of the security forces: There is an urgent need for robust, targeted training as well as capacity building for military and security forces so as to improve their human rights record in counter-insurgency operations. It is crucial for the military to understand that human rights violations hamper the success of its efforts and increase the appeal of the Boko Haram insurgency. This recognition and improved training could boost public confidence in the Nigerian security forces, thus encouraging citizens to share information on the insurgents and their collaborators.

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